Justice Cynthia D. Kinser, joined by Justice Donald W. Lemons, considered the two most conservative justices of the Court, wrote a lengthy dissent that was highly critical of both the majority's reasoning and the action of the circuit court in commuting the sentence. Even less compelling (if possible) is the Court’s argument, ante, at 11, that evidence of “national consensus” is to be found in the infrequency with which retarded persons are executed in States that do not bar their execution. Atkins was nevertheless sentenced to death. In other words, unless it can be shown that executing the mentally retarded promotes the goals of retribution and deterrence, doing so is nothing more than "purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering", making the death penalty cruel and unusual in those cases. As a sociological and moral conclusion that is implausible; and it is doubly implausible as an interpretation of the United States Constitution.” Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 863-864 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Ante, at 14-15. Who says so? Code §35-36-9-6 (1998); Rondon v. State, 711 N. E. 2d 506, 512 (Ind. Justices Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr. and Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr. each authored dissenting opinions and joined in each other's dissent. An excessiveness claim is judged by currently prevailing standards of decency. Given that anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation protecting violent criminals, the large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of legislation reinstating such executions) provides powerful evidence that today society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal. The first assumption is wrong, as I explained at length in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966-990 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.). Footage of Atkins and Jones in the vehicle with Nesbitt was captured on the ATM's CCTV camera, which showed Nesbitt in the middle between the two men and leaning across Jones to withdraw money. Justice Cynthia D. Kinser authored the five-member majority. In 1986, Georgia was the first state to outlaw the execution of the mentally retarded. In dissent, Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice William Rehnquist argued that in spite of the increased number of states that had outlawed the execution of the mentally retarded, there was no clear national consensus, and even if one existed, the Eighth Amendment provided no basis for using such measures of opinion to determine what is "cruel and unusual".

Stat. N. Y.

“In upsetting this particularized judgment on the basis of a constitutional absolute,” the Court concludes that no one who is even slightly mentally retarded can have sufficient “moral responsibility to be subjected to capital punishment for any crime.

But in what other direction could we possibly see change? But never mind; its discussion of even the other two does not bear analysis.) 2d 162, 174 (1992); Mo. 2. We have never before held it to be cruel and unusual punishment to impose a sentence in violation of some other constitutional imperative. Not 18 States, but only seven–18% of death penalty jurisdictions–have legislation of that scope. Moreover, even in States allowing the execution of mentally retarded offenders, the practice is uncommon. N. Y. Crim. [5][6], This case overturned a previous ruling or rulings, List of United States Supreme Court decisions on capital punishment, List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 536, List of United States Supreme Court cases, "At Last, the Supreme Court Turns to Mental Disability and the Death Penalty", "Opinion analysis: A new limit on the death penalty", "Il diritto straniero e la Corte suprema statunitense", "Lawyer Reveals Secret, Toppling Death Sentence - New York Times", "Virginia: Inmate Will Remain on Death Row", http://www.americanbar.org/publications/project_press/2009/summer/virginia_supremecourtvacatesdeathsentencefordarylatkins.html, Amicus brief of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, Amicus brief of the American Association on Mental Retardation, Virginia Supreme Court Opinion in Atkins v. Commonwealth including dissents of Hassell and Koontz, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Atkins_v._Virginia&oldid=979629491, United States Supreme Court decisions that overrule a prior Supreme Court decision, United States Supreme Court cases of the Rehnquist Court, Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and death penalty case law, Short description is different from Wikidata, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License, Remanded to Circuit Court, 581 S.E.2d 514 (Va. 2003). Times, Aug. 7, 2000 p. A1 (reporting that 10% of death row inmates are retarded). Although Atkins's case and ruling may have saved other mentally handicapped inmates from the death penalty, a jury in Virginia decided in July 2005 that Atkins was intelligent enough to be executed on the basis that the constant contact he had with his lawyers provided intellectual stimulation and raised his IQ above 70, making him competent to be put to death under Virginia law.

(b) Much has changed since Penry’s conclusion that the two state statutes then existing that prohibited such executions, even when added to the 14 States that had rejected capital punishment completely, did not provide sufficient evidence of a consensus. Ann. Also, the "relationship between mental retardation and the penological purposes served by the death penalty" justifies a conclusion that executing the mentally retarded is cruel and unusual punishment that the Eighth Amendment should forbid. Thus, there is a greater risk that the jury may impose the death penalty despite the existence of evidence that suggests that a lesser penalty should be imposed.

In succeeding decades, other American States continued the trend towards abolition … . As a result, Atkins's death sentence was upheld. Ante, at 13-14. The jury convicted Atkins of capital murder. First, there is a serious question whether either justification underpinning the death penalty–retribution and deterrence of capital crimes–applies to mentally retarded offenders.

[n5] Few, if any, of the States have had sufficient experience with these laws to know whether they are sensible in the long term. See also Bonner & Rimer, Executing the Mentally Retarded Even as Laws Begin to Shift, N. Y. Affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, in rejecting Atkins’ contention that he could not be sentenced to death because he is mentally retarded.

Eleven of those that the Court counts enacted statutes prohibiting execution of mentally retarded defendants convicted after, or convicted of crimes committed after, the effective date of the legislation;[n1] those already on death row, or consigned there before the statute’s effective date, or even (in those States using the date of the crime as the criterion of retroactivity) tried in the future for murders committed many years ago, could be put to death. The Court’s thrashing about for evidence of “consensus” includes reliance upon the margins by which state legislatures have enacted bans on execution of the retarded. The … Rev. This means that inflicting the death penalty on one mentally retarded individual is less likely to deter other mentally retarded individuals from committing crimes. Congress followed two years later, and the next year Maryland joined these two jurisdictions. §13-703.02(I) (Supp. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 21 (121st ed. ed. §13-703.02; Conn. Gen. Stat. The mistaken premise of the decision would have been frozen into constitutional law, making it difficult to refute and even more difficult to reject.” 487 U.S., at 854-855.

Instead, they were often committed to civil confinement or made wards of the State, thereby preventing them from “go[ing] loose, to the terror of the king’s subjects.” 4 Blackstone 25; see also S. Brakel, J. Parry, & B. Weiner, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 12-14 (3d ed. Ariz. Rev. Not only does it, like all of that jurisprudence, find no support in the text or history of the Eighth Amendment; it does not even have support in current social attitudes regarding the conditions that render an otherwise just death penalty inappropriate. 260 Va. 375, 534 S. E. 2d 312, reversed and remanded. The two suspects were quickly tracked down and arrested. Stat. The jury convicted Atkins of capital murder. “First” among these objective factors are the “statutes passed by society’s elected representatives,” Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989); because it “will rarely if ever be the case that the Members of this Court will have a better sense of the evolution in views of the American people than do their elected representatives,” Thompson, supra, at 865 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Justice Scalia, with whom the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas join, dissenting. Ann.

Ante, at 16.

While there are 50 states, 19 don't allow the death penalty under any circumstance, making 21 out of 31 a clear majority of the death penalty states. §532.140(3) (1999); Md.

492 U.S., at 334.

The citing of an amicus brief from the European Union also drew criticism from Chief Justice Rehnquist, who denounced the "Court's decision to place weight on foreign laws".[3]. Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but diminish their personal culpability. Affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, in rejecting Atkins' contention that he could not be sentenced to death because he is mentally retarded. The arrogance of this assumption of power takes one’s breath away. 4ATKINS v. VIRGINIA Opinion of the Court The jury sentenced Atkins to death, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing be-cause the trial court had used a misleading verdict form.

Surely culpability, and deservedness of the most severe retribution, depends not merely (if at all) upon the mental capacity of the criminal (above the level where he is able to distinguish right from wrong) but also upon the depravity of the crime–which is precisely why this sort of question has traditionally been thought answerable not by a categorical rule of the sort the Court today imposes upon all trials, but rather by the sentencer’s weighing of the circumstances (both degree of retardation and depravity of crime) in the particular case.

Our prior cases have generally required a much higher degree of agreement before finding a punishment cruel and unusual on “evolving standards” grounds. At the resentencing, Dr. Nelson again testified. Subsequently, a significant number of States have concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal, and similar bills have passed at least one house in other States. The genuinely operative portion of the opinion, then, is the Court’s statement of the reasons why it agrees with the contrived consensus it has found, that the “diminished capacities” of the mentally retarded render the death penalty excessive. That is not a statement of absolute moral repugnance, but one of current preference between two tolerable approaches. Nor will exempting the mentally retarded from execution lessen the death penalty’s deterrent effect with respect to offenders who are not mentally retarded. Further forensic evidence implicating the two men were found in Nesbitt's abandoned vehicle. There is none. Once the Court admits (as it does) that mental retardation does not render the offender morally blameless, ante, at 13-14, there is no basis for saying that the death penalty is never appropriate retribution, no matter how heinous the crime. His execution date was set for December 2, 2005, but was later stayed. It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.

Atkins's version of the events, however, was found to contain a number of inconsistencies. 6.