Yet the Court held, not only that the invidious racism of Virginia’s law violated the Equal Protection Clause, see 388 U. S., at 7-12, but also that the law deprived the Lovings of due process by denying them the “freedom of choice to marry” that had “long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Id., at 12. Homosexual sodomy was a capital crime under Roman law. If not, may the State save the statute by announcing that it will only enforce the law against homosexuals? Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause for respondent Hardwick. of Oral Arg. Stat.

Respondent then brought suit in the Federal District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the statute insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy.
Rev. I believe that neither of the two general justifications for § 16-6-2 that petitioner has advanced warrants dismissing respondent’s challenge for failure to state a claim. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the law was in violation of the … Illinois: Ill. Rev. Delaware: Del. “The Constitution cannot control such prejudices, but neither can it tolerate them. 34, § 6 (1855). contend that the right of privacy, as derived from the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights, readily and reasonably includes the right of an adult person of whatever sexual orientation (to wit., whether heterosexual, bisexual, gay or lesbian) to choose to engage in physically private, consenting, non-violent sexual activities with another adult person. This is the old version of the H2O platform and is now read-only. D. C. 262, 746 F. 2d 1579 (1984). But the Georgia electorate has expressed no such belief — instead, its representatives enacted a law that presumably reflects the belief that all sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.

In all events, it is perfectly clear that the State of Georgia may not totally prohibit the conduct proscribed by § 16-6-2 of the Georgia Criminal Code.

3, and that they had been “chilled and deterred” from engaging in such activity by both the existence of the statute and Hardwick’s arrest. Unless the Court is prepared to conclude that such a law is constitutional, it may not rely on the work product of the Georgia Legislature to support its holding. Tennessee: Tenn. Code, ch. 1672).

5, § 6, p. 127 (1821) (passed 1776).

7, § 124 (1866). Stat., Crim. [*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights by Steven Frederick McDowell; for the Rutherford Institute et al.

Acts of the Twentieth General Assembly, Mar. That certain, but by no means all, religious groups condemn the behavior at issue gives the State no license to impose their judgments on the entire citizenry. [1] See Ga. Code Ann. 8 (stating that application of the statute to a married couple “would be unconstitutional” because of the “right of marital privacy as identified by the Court in Griswold”). While it is true that these cases may be characterized by their connection to protection of the family, see Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 619 (1984), the Court’s conclusion that they extend no further than this boundary ignores the warning in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 501 (1977) (plurality opinion), against “clos[ing] our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the family have been accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” We protect those rights not because they contribute, in some direct and material way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an individual’s life.

The second possibility is similarly unacceptable. 1797). 6. See Ala. Code § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982) (1-year maximum); Ariz. Rev. 7, § 655 (1874). Rather, this case is about “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,” namely, “the right to be let alone.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.

Certainly, some private behavior can affect the fabric of society as a whole. Missouri: 1 Mo.

Stat., ch. 10, § 48 (1865).

Cf. That would be a mere shadow of freedom.

§§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (West Supp. At the very least, I think it clear at this early stage of the litigation that respondent has alleged a constitutional claim sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.[13]. ): Howell Code, ch. In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 326 (1937), it was said that this category includes those fundamental liberties that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither 192*192 liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.” A different description of fundamental liberties appeared in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503 (1977) (opinion of POWELL, J. The Court’s failure to comprehend the magnitude of the liberty interests at stake in this case leads it to slight the question whether petitioner, on behalf of the State, has justified Georgia’s infringement on these interests. Permitting the kinds of searches that might be necessary to obtain evidence of the sexual activity banned by § 16-6-2 seems no less intrusive, or repugnant. It raises no question about the right or propriety of state legislative decisions to repeal their laws that criminalize homosexual sodomy, or of state-court decisions invalidating those laws on state constitutional grounds. One of the reasons for the Court’s holding in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), was precisely the possibility, and repugnance, of permitting searches to obtain evidence regarding the use of contraceptives. The circuit court ruled the Georgia law unconstitutional, writing that the law violated the respondent's rights to privacy, and that the act was beyond the reach of state regulation because of the Due Process Clause.

We protect the decision whether to have a child because parenthood alters so dramatically an individual’s self-definition, not because of demographic considerations or the Bible’s command to be fruitful and multiply. [6] The predecessor of the current Georgia statute provided: “Sodomy is the carnal knowledge and connection against the order of nature, by man with man, or in the same unnatural manner with woman.” Ga. Code, Tit. .

Florida: Fla. Rev. This is essentially not a question of personal “preferences” but rather of the legislative authority of the State. Cf. Brief for Petitioner 19; see ante, at 190, 192-194, 196.

Under the Georgia statute a single act of sodomy, even in the private setting of a home, is a 198*198 felony comparable in terms of the possible sentence imposed to serious felonies such as aggravated battery, § 16-5-24, first-degree arson, § 16-7-60, and robbery, § 16-8-40.[1]. Every Bundle includes the complete text from each of the titles below: ... Bowers v. Hardwick478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 92 L. Ed. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix”), with Brief for Petitioner 20-21 (relying on the Old and New Testaments and the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas to show that “traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe such conduct”). Determined the constitutionality of state anti-sodomy laws. See Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U. S., at 66, n. 13 (“marital intercourse on a street corner or a theater stage” can be forbidden despite the constitutional protection identified in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965)).[7]. [5] The parallel between Loving and this case is almost uncanny. Rev.

& Pub. L. 159, 167, n. 47 (1967).

§ 566.090 (Supp. by Edward P Errante, Leonard Graff, and Jay Kohorn.

See Survey, U. Miami L. First, it has recognized a privacy interest with reference to certain decisions that are properly for the individual to make. Id., at 568, n. 11.

Laws, 1861-1900, Crimes and Punishments, § 45. . As JUSTICE POWELL points out, moreover, Georgia’s prohibition on private, consensual sodomy has not been enforced for decades. This prohibition of heterosexual sodomy was not purely hortatory. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding that the Due Process Clause did not confer any fundamental right on acts of consensual sodomy. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 506.

[10] The essential “liberty” that animated the development of the law in cases like Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey surely embraces the right to engage in nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others may consider offensive or immoral.
25 Hen.

”(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years. 28-29, with ante, at 192-194, and n. 6.

New York: Laws of New York, ch. “Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government.” Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747, 772 (1986). California: 1 Cal. See Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S. E. 799 (1939). The First Laws of the State of Georgia, pt. [8], Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.” See also Karst, 89 Yale L. J., at 627.

Argued March 31, 1986 Decided June 30, 1986. An individual’s ability to make constitutionally protected “decisions concerning sexual relations,” Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 711 (1977) (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), is rendered empty indeed if he or she is given no real choice but a life without any physical intimacy.

Indeed, the right of an individual to conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or her own home seems to me to be the heart of the Constitution’s protection of privacy. VIII, ch. [2] It was conceded at oral argument that, prior to the complaint against respondent Hardwick, there had been no reported decision involving prosecution for private homosexual sodomy under this statute for several decades. I need not reach either the Eighth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause issues because I believe that Hardwick has stated a cognizable claim that § 16-6-2 interferes with constitutionally protected interests in privacy and freedom of intimate association. E. g., United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980); Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253 (1960). 189*189 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.