The Administrator's deferential reasonableness/balancing test is, at best, a legal dinosaur that went extinct long ago in the history of the Supreme Court's Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence.79 As the Supreme Court further stated in Hostetter (and again quoted in the Midcal Aluminum and Bacchus decisions): Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same Constitution. Texas wineries may sell wine directly to Texas consumers "in an amount not to exceed 25,000 gallons annually,"35 with no per-customer restrictions. The sole exception to this comprehensive regulatory scheme is § 107.07 of the Code, which provides that "a Texas resident may import for his own personal use not more than three gallons of wine without being required to hold a permit.... A person importing wine under this subsection must personally accompany the wine ... as it enters the state." 1994), cert. 865 (quoting 42 U.S.C § 1983) (emphasis added). Id. ALCO. Where's the functional discrimination?57. Texas is a significant consumer of wine, but demand is not being supplied by Texas wineries.

Furthermore, regarding the state's claim that the purpose of the ABC law was to conduct a limited experiment by selling a wine product in a different type of retail outlet, a decision within the state's regulatory twenty-first amendment power or that only wine products with alcoholic content not in excess of 6% to promote temperance should be sold in groceries, Judge Brieant observed that the claimed temperance-related goal was insufficient to validate the law and that the experiment bore no logical relationship to the place where the grapes were grown to make the wine product. 2080. Bev.Code Ann. The U.S. District Court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs (at 87 F. Supp.2d 691 (S.D. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 110, 100 S.Ct. Asserting that the standing requirement is not narrow or rigidly formalistic, Plaintiffs claim that they come within the "zone of interest" of persons injured by the prohibition against purchasing wine from out-of-state vintners under § 107.07(f). The Court refers the parties to its brief summary of the relationship between and two-tiered approach of the Supreme Court to the commerce clause and the twenty-first amendment in footnote 2 of this memorandum and order as a starting point. All parties were ordered to rebrief their motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs are oenophiles who reside in the Houston area.

§ 107.07(a) and (f) facially discriminates against out-of-state vintners and wine shippers, especially small ones, prohibiting direct shipments to consumers and in requiring them to attempt to go through Texas retailers to ship wines to in-state consumers, thereby benefiting Texas wholesalers and retailers by means of such economic protectionism, negatively impacting Texas consumers because of more limited wine selection and higher prices, and impeding interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause. 1999)(relying on McBeath, Quality Brands, and Loretto).

789 (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579, 106 S.Ct. Plaintiffs are not seeking to create a national, unregulated market in wine; rather, they seek only equal treatment between in-state and out-of-state wineries under Texas statutes, 445 U.S. 97, 100 S.Ct. That broker may then solicit orders for wine from permittees authorized to transport wine into Texas. 2675, 129 L.Ed.2d 810 (1994). 811, 136 L.Ed.2d 761 (1997), the Supreme Court stated.

2440. The statute, on the other hand, does not serve these public policy interests. at 862. § 110.053); Act of May 5, 1995, 74th Leg., ch. Id. Shortly thereafter, the Seventh Circuit issued its decision in Bridenbaugh v. O'Bannon, reversing a district court's ruling in the Northern District of Indiana that the district court here had relied on in its summary judgment order.4 In light of the Seventh Circuit's Bridenbaugh decision, the district court granted the Administrator's motion for reconsideration. We will address these two claims in order. 2491, 105 L.Ed.2d 275 (1989)(an affirmation statute requiring brewers and importers to affirm that their posted prices were no higher than their prices in bordering states and which allowed out-of-state brewers and importers to change their out-state prices). This is the kind of economic discrimination, the court explained, that is proscribed by the Commerce Clause: The purpose of the state scheme is economic discrimination against out-of-state interests or, depending on one's point of view, economic protectionism of in-state competitors. Because the Court finds from the statute's effect that Texas' purpose in § 107.07 is protection of in-state liquor wholesalers and retailers at the expense of out-of-state wine sellers, the more flexible Pike approach22 is not applicable and the Court applies the stricter rule of invalidity. A at 3-4. 1915 (1945), and Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571, 117 S.Ct. 2080 (citing Bacchus for the proposition that state regulation of alcohol is reviewable under the Commerce Clause). The court also granted Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint, in which they maintained that the Administrator raised new arguments in his motion for reconsideration. 128 (1939)(declaring comprehensive Kentucky statute regulating liquor transportation and distribution valid and stating that "[w]ithout doubt a state may absolutely prohibit the manufacture of intoxicants, their transportation, sale, or the use to which they are put"). R. CIV. The foundation of the Administrator's position is simple: § 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740, 104 S.Ct. Id. Such interests are purely in-state economic interests and are unrelated to temperance. Bailey is related to Carolyn Ann Dickerson and Darwin Ellis Dickerson as well as 2 additional people. Do the challenged provisions of the TABC violate the Commerce Clause?

The Court discusses them chronologically since they build on each other. The reason: The right secured by the Commerce Clause is the right to engage in interstate trade that is free from discriminatory restrictions imposed by the statesId. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 712-16, 104 S.Ct. In other words, the Texas legislature became concerned that increased "demand [for wine] is not being supplied by Texas wineries"47 — relative to California's and other states' wineries — and thus embarked on the plan to create special exemptions for its in-state wineries to bolster their sales.

601 F.Supp. On appeal, the Administrator argues that, even if we affirm the district court's decision concerning the unconstitutionality of § 107.07 and related statutes, we should reform that court's ordered remedy. 3049 (quoting Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 443, 25 L.Ed. 1138, 1142-43 (D.D.C.1989), aff'd, 901 F.2d 1130 (D.C.Cir.1990) (same); Loretto Winery, Ltd. v. Gazzara, 601 F.Supp.

BEV.CODE ANN. Finally, Defendant notes that as a practical matter, according to TABC's records as well as Plaintiffs' summary judgment evidence in the affidavit of Troy Clark, CEO of Wiederkehr Wine Cellars, Inc., Wiederkehr has a Non-Resident Seller's permit to ship its wine into a licensed wholesaler in Texas, specifically Longhorn Liquors Ltd. Ex. The Supreme Court has held that "when the `right invoked is that of equal treatment,' the appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal treatment, a result that can be accomplished by withdrawal of benefits from the favored class as well as by extension of benefits to the excluded class. Violations of § 107.07 are punishable as crimes.

Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624, 98 S.Ct. Id. Cooper, 11 F.3d at 555 (quoting Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 275, 104 S.Ct. To paraphrase the Bard, that which we call discrimination by any other name would still smell as foul. 937 citing Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332, 84 S.Ct. As will be addressed, the Supreme Court's view of the state's powers to regulate liquor importation under the twenty-first amendment in view of the commerce clause has increasingly been narrowed and modified during the past sixty years. The Texas legislature first enacted this code in 1935, following the repeal of Prohibition and the adoption of the Twenty-First Amendment, which returned regulation of alcoholic beverages to the states.29 The TABC was first enacted, and amended over the years, pursuant to "the police power of the state [of Texas] for the protection of the welfare, health, peace, temperance, and safety of the people of the state. In Quality Brands v. Barry, 715 F.Supp. ), aff'd and modified as to remedy sub nom. 1293. In all other respects, the second summary judgment decision remained unchanged. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 276, 104 S.Ct. Plaintiffs also challenged the Administrator's new claim of equal treatment for in-state and out-of-state wineries under § 107.07, specifically highlighting § 107.12 as facially discriminatory in favor of in-state wineries at the expense of out-of-state wineries.6 Finally, Plaintiffs expanded the scope of the relief they sought, requesting that numerous "duplicative" statutes in the TABC be adjudged as unconstitutional, either facially or as applied.7, In its second, and equally comprehensive, Memorandum and Order, the district court acknowledged that its prior summary judgment ruling and the Bridenbaugh decision "motivated both sides to reframe their claims. Balancing the limitations on the states imposed by the commerce clause against the states' inherent authority to regulate liquor under the twenty-first amendment, Defendant emphasizes that state statutes regulating the importation and distribution of alcohol within their borders is afforded broad discretion as a means of limiting or prohibiting it. Gen., Rance Lamar Craft (argued), Austin, TX, for Bailey. In Cooper, we held that similar conclusional and unsubstantiated assertions were unavailing,93 and they remain so when we are asked again to review other discriminatory provisions in the same regulatory statutes that were before us in Cooper.94. Select this result to view Bailey Iii Dickerson III's phone number, address, and more.

1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring). BEV.CODE ANN. 1727 (state must demonstrate local benefits of statute and lack of neutral alternatives adequate to present interests at stake); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 456, 112 S.Ct.

Accordingly, the district court held that the subject provisions of the TABC are not saved by the powers granted to the states under § 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment to regulate alcohol.