During the week before that drawing, Seward traveled to Florida and purchased several lottery tickets. Because of the judgment we enter on the appeal, the issue Dickerson raised in her petition for the writ of mandamus is moot.2. It is available at doc.deno.land. This order remained in effect throughout the trial of the case. Dickerson says that "[t]he parties in those cases did not attempt to increase their odds of winning the foreign lottery by entering into a separate contract with each other" and that "the cases cited by plaintiffs generally hold that individuals may cross state lines and jointly purchase a lottery ticket in a state where such lotteries are legal, and the parties may enforce their rights in the jointly owned ticket," but, she says, "[that] fact situation is not present in this case." He placed each individual ticket in a separate envelope and wrote the name of the intended recipient on the outside of the envelope.
Holder of Sirote & Permutt, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant/petitioner Tonda Dickerson.

They cite several cases they contend support their argument that the oral agreement made in this case was not founded on a gambling consideration. They first cite Talley v. Mathis, 265 Ga. 179, 453 S.E.2d 704 (1995), as being a "strikingly similar case." 416 (1991). Likewise, none of the parties agreed to pay money upon the happening of the uncertain event; but, rather each agreed to acknowledge the joint ownership of his or her ticket by all the parties regardless of the happening of the uncertain event. The consideration consisted not of the uncertain event (the lottery) or the possible winnings from the lottery but rather of the mutual agreements among the parties.

51, 259 A.2d 920 (1969); Campbell v. Campbell, 213 A.D.2d 1027, 624 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1995); Stepp v. Freeman, 119 Ohio App. Thus the agreement, or contract, at issue is not "founded in whole or in part on a gambling consideration" as outlawed by § 8-1-150, Ala.Code 1975. Following the trial, the advisory jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the trial court entered a final judgment in the plaintiffs' favor.

However, we conclude that the parties presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that the parties did orally agree that if any one of them should win the lottery, then they all would divide the proceeds. 1981392 (the appeal)—REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED. Thus the agreement, or contract, at issue is not "founded in whole or in part on a gambling consideration" as outlawed by § 8-1-150, Ala.Code 1975. On several occasions Seward would travel to Florida and purchase lottery tickets and upon his return would give the tickets to various friends and family members, including the employees of the Waffle House. Dickerson v. Deno, 770 So. Instead, it ordered that the case be tried before an advisory jury on the plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief. Consequently, we conclude that the agreement at issue here was "founded ... on a gambling consideration," within the meaning of that phrase in § 8-1-150 and that it was, therefore, void. She also argues that, assuming, arguendo, that the alleged oral agreement did have all the elements ordinarily necessary for a contract, it was void as a gambling contract, because, she argues, it was an agreement made in Alabama and § 8-1-150 specifically provides that "[a]ll contracts founded in whole or in part on a gambling consideration are void.". February 18th, 2000, Precedential Status: Seward did not expect to share any potential lottery winnings based on the tickets he gave away, but he claimed that he was promised a new truck by the employees of the Waffle House if one of the tickets he distributed there was a winning ticket. Shortly thereafter, on March 18, 1999, the plaintiffs sued Dickerson, alleging that they and Dickerson had orally contracted with each other that if any one of them should win, then the winner would share any lottery winnings with the other ticket recipients. Consequently, we conclude that the agreement at issue here was "founded ... on a gambling consideration," within the meaning of that phrase in § 8-1-150 and that it was, therefore, void. The ticket won a prize of approximately $5 million.1.

They first cite Talley v. Mathis, 265 Ga. 179, 453 S.E.2d 704 (1995), as being a "strikingly similar case." That is, each party received the acknowledgment of each other party that such other's ticket was jointly owned by all the parties. During the week before that drawing, Seward traveled to Florida and purchased several lottery tickets. Because of the judgment we enter on the appeal, the issue Dickerson raised in her petition for the writ of mandamus is moot.[2].

Each lottery ticket was purchased by Seward in Florida and was presented by him to one or the other of the parties, separately. Stated differently, the agreement, according to the plaintiffs' own evidence, was that Dickerson would pay the plaintiffs a sum of money upon the happening of an uncertain event over which no party had control, that is, upon Dickerson's ticket winning the Florida lottery. 265 Ga. at 181, 453 S.E.2d at 706.

HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, and BROWN, JJ., concur.

However, we conclude that the parties presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that the parties did orally agree that if any one of them should win the lottery, then they all would divide the proceeds. Stephen E. Clements of Clute & Clements, P.C., Mobile; and Tristan R. Armer of Law Offices of Anna M. Williams, Grand Bay, for appellees/respondents Sandra Deno, Angie Tisdale, Matthew Adams, and Jackie Fairley. From Free Law Project, a 501(c)(3) non-profit. Consequently, the agreement between the parties was nothing more than an attempt by each of the five lottery-ticket holders to increase his or her odds of winning some portion of the Florida lottery. The alleged oral contract in this case was an exchange of promises to share winnings from the parties' individually owned lottery tickets upon the happening of the uncertain event that the numbers drawn in the Florida *67 lottery matched the numbers on one of the tickets held by the five individuals. Thus the agreement, or contract, at issue is not "founded in whole or in part on a gambling consideration" as outlawed by § 8-1-150, Ala.Code 1975. On March 6, 1999, before the lottery drawing, Seward presented the plaintiffs Deno, Tisdale, and Adams each with an envelope containing one lottery ticket. 798, 586 N.E.2d 970 (1992), and Fitchie v. Yurko, 212 Ill.App.3d 216, 570 N.E.2d 892, 156 Ill. Dec. 416 (1991). Likewise, none of the parties agreed to pay money upon the happening of the uncertain event; but, rather each agreed to acknowledge the joint ownership of his or her ticket by all the parties regardless of the happening of the uncertain event.


In her concluding argument, Dickerson says: We agree with Dickerson that the facts in this case show that there was no agreement to jointly purchase or to jointly hold the lottery tickets. The judgment of the trial court is due to be reversed and a judgment rendered for the defendant Dickerson. Tonda DICKERSON Stephen E. Clements of Clute & Clements, P.C., Mobile; and Tristan R. Armer of Law Offices of Anna M. Williams, Grand Bay, for appellees/respondents Sandra Deno, Angie Tisdale, Matthew Adams, and Jackie Fairley. The trial court refused to dismiss the complaint.

She also argues that, assuming, arguendo, that the alleged oral agreement did have all the elements ordinarily necessary for a contract, it was void as a gambling contract, because, she argues, it was an agreement made in Alabama and § 8-1-150 specifically provides that "[a]ll contracts founded in whole or in part on a gambling consideration are void.". But, assuming they entered into such an agreement, was that agreement void and unenforceable as a "contract[] founded ... on a gambling consideration"? The substance of the agreement among the parties is that each agreed that the lottery ticket held by him or her was jointly owned by all the parties. Charles R. Driggars and Gary B. 51, 259 A.2d 920 (1969); Campbell v. Campbell, 213 A.D.2d 1027, 624 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1995); Stepp v. Freeman, 119 Ohio App.3d 68, 694 N.E.2d 510 (1997); Welford v. Nobrega, 411 Mass. The plaintiffs also cite Kaszuba v. Zientara, 506 N.E.2d 1 (Ind.1987); Miller v. Radikopf, 394 Mich. 83, 228 N.W.2d 386 (1975); Pineiro v. Nieves, 108 N.J.Super.