If, on the other hand, the argument is meant as an appeal to logic rather than stare decisis, it is a classic example of begging the question: Congress's attempt to set aside Miranda, since it represents an assertion that violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution, also represents an assertion that the Court has no power to impose Miranda on the States. . The opinion explained that the question whether the "police conduct complained of directly infringed upon respondent's right against compulsory selfincrimination" was a "separate question" from "whether it instead violated only the prophylactic rules developed to protect that right." See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436-437 (1982) (holding that a permanent physical occupation constitutes a per se taking); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance *458 of counsel is actually "violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent"). The Court therefore concluded that something more than the totality test was necessary. See, e. g., Miranda, 384 U. S., at 445-458. modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that
However, a review of our opinion in Miranda clarifies that this disclaimer was intended to indicate that the Constitution does not require police to administer the particular Miranda warnings, not that the Constitution does not require a procedure that is effective in securing Fifth Amendment rights. [2] The Court cites my dissenting opinion in Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331-332 (1999), for the proposition that "the fact that a rule has found `wide acceptance in the legal culture' is `adequate reason not to overrule' it." . And at least one case decided shortly after Miranda explicitly confirmed the view. . substitute for the warnings required by Miranda. a risk that the Court found unacceptably great when the confession is offered in the case in chief to prove guilt. . Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution.
What is set forth there reads as though it was written precisely with the current status of Miranda in mind: Moreover, it is not clear why the Court thinks that the "totality-of-the-circumstances test . See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part) ("[A]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances"). This case therefore turns on whether York v. Quarles and Harris v. New York But we have also broadened the See also Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 344-345 (1981) (per curiam) (stating that "[f]ederal judges .
While we have We concluded that the coercion inherent in See, e. g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S., at 515 ("The line between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw"). constitutionally based is found in the Miranda Court's invitation for . The meaning to be ascribed to an Act of Congress can only be derived from a considered weighing of every relevant aid to construction.6 These lead to the conclusion that the judgment of the court below must be reversed.
Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.' Miranda requires procedures that will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and which will assure the suspect that the exercise of that right will be honored. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331-332 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the fact that a rule has found "`wide acceptance in the legal culture' " is "adequate reason not to overrule" it). Prior to Miranda, we *433 evaluated the admissibility of a suspect's confession under a voluntariness test. side--that Miranda is a constitutional decision--is that both Miranda and two of . Rep. 568 (Ct. Crim. "prophylactic," New York v. Quarles, and "not themselves rights Prior to Miranda, we evaluated the admissibility With respect to proceedings in state courts, our "authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution." From Free Law Project, a 501(c)(3) non-profit. Did Congress have the authority to pass such a law? . are required by the Constitution, in the sense that nothing else will suffice to In imposing its Court-made code upon the States, the original opinion at least asserted that it was demanded by the Constitution. believe we cannot allow to remain on the books even a celebrated decision-- . The Court felt that this was not the case in Miranda. § 3501,[2] directed federal trial judges to admit statements of criminal defendants if they were made voluntarily, without regard to whether he had received the Miranda warnings. given before a suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation could be such authority, § 3501's totality- of-the-circumstances approach must prevail Appeals is therefore. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 (1984). But as we said in Berkemer v. McCarty, . Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 444. contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely"); id., at 457, n. 26 (noting *448 the "absurdity of denying that a confession obtained under these circumstances is compelled"). [T]he In imposing its Court-made code . . A federal law was in place that allowed the admission of statements if they were voluntarily made.
There was available to the Court a means of reconciling the established proposition that a violation of Miranda does not itself offend the Fifth Amendment with the Court's assertion of a right to ignore the present statute. . But we need not go further than Miranda to decide this case.
Relying on the fact that we have created several exceptions to Miranda `s warnings requirement and that we have repeatedly referred to the Miranda warnings as "prophylactic," New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 *438 (1984), and "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution," Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974),[2] the Court of Appeals concluded that the protections announced in Miranda are not constitutionally required. Since that time, we have consistently applied Miranda 's rule to prosecutions arising in state courts.
. . . . As the Court chooses to describe that principle, statutes of Congress can be disregarded, not only when what they prescribe violates the Constitution, but when what they prescribe contradicts a decision of this Court that “announced a constitutional rule,” . on the fact that we have created several exceptions to Miranda's warnings the voluntariness of a suspect's confession. The additional remedies cited by amicus do not, in our view, render them, together with § 3501, an adequate substitute for the warnings required by Miranda. . Today's judgment converts Miranda from a milestone of judicial overreaching into the very Cheops' Pyramid (or perhaps the Sphinx would be a better analogue) of judicial arrogance.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, and began by briefly describing the historical backdrop against which the Miranda ruling had emerged. There is a world of difference, which the Court recognized under the traditional voluntariness test but ignored in Miranda, between compelling a suspect to incriminate himself and preventing him from foolishly doing so of his own accord. Brief Fact Summary. and that therefore Congress could by statute have the final say on the question I see little harm in admitting that we made a mistake in taking away from the people the ability to decide for themselves what protections (beyond those required by the Constitution) are reasonably affordable in the criminal investigatory process. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991). *441 The Court of Appeals also relied on the fact that we have, after our Miranda decision, made exceptions from its rule in cases such as New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), and Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time The Court cites Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989), as accurately reflecting our standard for overruling, see ante, at 443which I am pleased to accept, even though Patterson was speaking of overruling statutory cases and the standard for constitutional decisions is somewhat more lenient. While we have overruled our precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings, . .
Schneckloth, 412 U. S., at 226. The judgment of the Court of . That section provides, in relevant part: (a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United Dickerson’s attorney argued that the FBI agents and local law enforcement violated Dickerson’s right against self-incrimination when they failed to notify him of his Miranda rights (per Miranda v. Arizona). But first and foremost of the factors on the other side-that Miranda is a constitutional decision-is that both Miranda and two of its companion cases applied the rule to proceedings in state courts-to wit, Arizona, California, and New York. people. apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous Over time, our cases . 2d 405, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 4305, Docket Number: effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on [8] Various other contentions and suggestions have been pressed by the numerous amici, but because of the procedural posture of this case we do not think it appropriate to consider them. . . . The defendant nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and responded that "the gun is over there." The Court of Appeals also noted that in Oregon v. Elstad, .