florida v riley quimbee

E. Brown, The Helicopter in Civil Operations 79 (1981). . 87-764. If the police had observed Riley embracing his wife in the backyard greenhouse, would we then say that his reasonable expectation of privacy had been infringed? In taking this view, the plurality ignores the very essence of Katz. Although an aerial inspection of a house's curtilage may not always pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply because the aircraft is within the navigable airspace specified by law, there is nothing in the record here to suggest that helicopters flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare that respondent could have reasonably anticipated that his greenhouse would not be observed from that altitude. Synopsis of Rule of Law. 4. And of course Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), which overruled Olmstead, made plain that the question whether or not the disputed evidence had been procured by means of a trespass was irrelevant. citations, implicitly recognize that none of our prior decisions tells us who has the burden of proving whether Riley's expectation of privacy was reasonable. find little attraction in the idea of using FAA regulations, because they were not formulated for the purpose of defining the reasonableness of citizens' expectations of privacy. HISTORY OF EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Synopsis of Rule of Law. . In the absence of precedent on the point, it is appropriate for us to take into account our estimation of the. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The inquiry then becomes how to determine whether Riley's expectation was a reasonable one. Riley no doubt intended and expected that his greenhouse would not be open to public inspection, and the precautions he took protected against ground-level observation. A warrant. Weeks v. United States (1914)

The order of this Court, however, is not to remand the case in this manner. The trial court granted his motion to suppress; the Florida Court of Appeals reversed, but certified the case to the Florida Supreme Court, which quashed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's suppression order. Ante at 488 U. S. 451. Federal Aviation Administration, Statistical Handbook of Aviation, Calendar Year 1986, p. 147. Suppose, finally, that the FAA regulations remained unchanged, so that the police were undeniably "where they had a right to be." Is the theoretical possibility that any member of the public (with sufficient means) could also have hired a helicopter and looked over Riley's fence of any relevance at all in determining. Katz, supra, at 361. See Coffin, Judicial Balancing, 63 N.Y.U.L.Rev. Therefore, whether Riley's expectation of privacy is reasonable turns on whether the police officer at 400 feet above his curtilage is seated in an airplane or a helicopter. Thus, because I believe that private helicopters rarely fly over curtilages at an altitude of 400 feet, I would impose upon the prosecution the burden of proving contrary facts necessary to show that Riley lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy. Respondent was charged with possession of marijuana under Florida law. The absence of anything "in the record or before us" to suggest the opposite, however, seems not to give the plurality pause. ", 511 So. The order of topics is occasionally somewhat different from that in the main outline. However, if the public can generally be expected to travel over residential backyards at an altitude of 400 feet, Riley cannot reasonably expect his curtilage to be free from such aerial observation.
In such circumstances, it makes no more sense to rely on the legality of the officer's position in the skies than it would to judge the constitutionality of the wiretap in Katz by the legality of the officer's position outside the telephone booth. While JUSTICE O'CONNOR's opinion gives reason to hope that this altitude may constitute a lower limit, I find considerable cause for concern in the fact that a plurality of four Justices would remove virtually all constitutional barriers to police surveillance from the vantage point of helicopters. There, acting on a tip, the police inspected the backyard of a particular house while flying in a fixed-wing aircraft at 1,000 feet. Your Study Buddy will automatically renew until cancelled. The principle enunciated in this case determines what limits the Fourth Amendment imposes on aerial surveillance of any person, for any reason. . Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 585 (8th Cir. [1] A good general rule, at least for ... CHAPTER 8 Argued October 3, 1988. The officer then obtained a search warrant based on his observations and discovered marijuana during the search. below that limit, the helicopter here was not violating the law, and any member of the public or the police could legally have observed respondent's greenhouse from that altitude. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/488/445/case.html. The fact that a helicopter could conceivably observe the curtilage at virtually any altitude or angle, without violating FAA regulations, does not in itself mean that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy from such observation. If so, I think we could take judicial notice that, while there may be an occasional privately owned helicopter that flies over populated areas at an altitude of 400 feet, such flights are a rarity, and are almost entirely limited to approaching or leaving airports or to reporting traffic congestion near major roadways. public observation of his backyard from aerial traffic at 400 feet. More than 10,000 helicopters, both public and private, are registered in the United States. The other two sides were not enclosed, but the contents of the greenhouse were obscured from view from surrounding property by trees, shrubs, and the mobile home. ."). I should think that this might be an apt occasion for the application of Professor Davis' distinction between "adjudicative" and "legislative" facts. [Footnote 3] Any member of the public could legally have been flying over Riley's property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet, and could have observed Riley's greenhouse. The police suspect that Mae is a drug dealer because a police informant has heard rumors that she is, but the police have no concrete evidence sufficient to obtain a search or arrest warrant. JUSTICE BRENNAN suggests that we may resolve it ourselves without any evidence in the record on this point.

But I cannot agree that one "knowingly exposes [an area] to the public" solely because a helicopter may legally fly above it. 17, 2000) Brief Fact Summary. Citation. The telephone company sued the contractor and the property owner to recover damages. The question before the Court is whether the helicopter surveillance over Riley's property constituted a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL LAW 349, 403 (1974); see also 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.1(d), pp. I concur in the judgment reversing the Supreme Court of Florida because I agree that police observation of the greenhouse in Riley's curtilage from a helicopter passing at an altitude of 400 feet did not violate an expectation of privacy "that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.'" The Court holds today that police officers need not obtain a warrant based on probable cause before circling in a helicopter 400 feet above a home in order to investigate what is taking place behind the walls of the curtilage. However, public use of altitudes lower than 400 feet -- particularly public observations from helicopters circling over the curtilage of a home -- may be sufficiently rare that police surveillance from such altitudes would violate reasonable expectations of privacy, despite compliance with FAA regulations. An officer’s naked eye observation of the interior of a partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard from the vantage point of a helicopter 400 feet above did not constitute a search requiring a warrant. While in both cases the police may have a legal right to occupy the physical space from which their observations are made, the two situations.

Ante at 451. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously held that the warrantless search and seizure of digital contents of a cell phone during an arrest is unconstitutional.. If indeed the purpose of the restraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment is to "safeguard the privacy and security of individuals," then it is puzzling why it should be the helicopter's noise, wind, and dust that provides the measure of whether this constitutional safeguard has been infringed. Notwithstanding the disclaimers of its final paragraph, the opinion relies almost exclusively on the fact that the police officer conducted his surveillance from a vantage point where, under applicable Federal Aviation Administration regulations, he had a legal right to be. Fixed-wing aircraft may not be operated below 500 feet (1,000 feet over congested areas), while helicopters may be operated below those levels. See Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Although reversing, the State Court of Appeals certified the case to the State Supreme Court on the question whether the helicopter surveillance from 400 feet constituted a "search" for which a warrant was required under the Fourth Amendment.

We held that "[i]n an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine," it is unreasonable to expect the curtilage to be constitutionally protected from aerial observation with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn.L.Rev. Every Bundle includes the complete text from each of the titles below: PLUS: Hundreds of law school topic-related videos from The Understanding Law Video Lecture Series™: Monthly Subscription ($19 / Month) Annual Subscription ($175 / Year). It is whether you and I must discipline ourselves to draw the blinds every time we enter a room, under pain of surveillance if we do not. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U. S. 543, 391 U. S. 548 (1968) (prosecutor has burden of proving consent to search), the burden of proof properly rests with the State, and, not with the individual defendant. The First Amendment: Freedom of Speech and of the Press It appears, therefore, that it is the FAA regulation, rather than any empirical inquiry, that is determinative.