For centuries no jurisdiction has countenanced the execution of the insane, yet this Court has never decided whether the Constitution forbids the practice. ., shall be presumed to be correct," and an evidentiary hearing not required. I therefore join the Court's judgment. Ann. endobj 263 0 obj Petitioner concedes that the Governor of Florida has determined that he is not insane under the standard prescribed by Florida's statute, which is the same as the standard just described. . St. Tr. 65-67. <> Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953); Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 (1948); Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897). Addington, supra, at 430. Yet the lodestar of any effort to devise a procedure must be the overriding dual imperative of providing redress for those with substantial claims and of encouraging accuracy in the factfinding determination. Townsend v. Sain, supra, at 312. Today, no State in the Union permits the execution of the insane. Today we keep faith with our common-law heritage in holding that it does.
752 F.2d 526 (CA11 1985). Id., at 316. See 1 N. Walker, Crime and Insanity in England 194-203 (1968). Goode v. Wainwright, 448 So.2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1984). Only after all of these challenges had been resolved against him did petitioner challenge his impending execution on the ground of insanity. Rule of Law/Holding of the Case The Supreme Court issued the following rulings on the two questions presented before it in Ford v. As is often true of common-law principles, see O. Holmes, The Common Law 5 (1881), the reasons for the rule are less sure and less uniform than the rule itself. Ante, at 406-408. 0000002207 00000 n This holding is based almost entirely on two unremarkable observations.

Unless the relevant language is to be read out of the statute, I see no basis for affording any deference to the Governor's determination. Codified Laws § 23A-27A-24 (1979); Utah Code Ann. As currently implemented, the Florida procedure for determining competency violates this bedrock principle. . Dr. Kaufman concluded that Ford had no understanding of why he was being executed, made no connection between the homicide of which he had been convicted and the death penalty, and indeed sincerely believed that he would not be executed because he owned the prisons and could control the Governor through mind waves. "The examination of the convicted person shall take place with all three psychiatrists present at the same time." Cf. Although we need not decide the issue in this case, the term "State court" may well encompass an independent panel of psychiatric experts who might both examine the defendant and determine his legal sanity. See also Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950). change. I cannot agree, however, that the federal, I conclude therefore that Florida law has created a protected expectation that no execution will be carried out while the prisoner lacks the "mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed on him.". 1985); Miss. Following the procedures set forth in the statute, the Governor of Florida appointed a panel of three psychiatrists to evaluate whether, under § 922.07(2), Ford had "the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and the reasons why it was imposed upon him." Indeed, respondent does not dispute that the Governor's office has steadfastly refused to acknowledge whether it would even review the extensive psychiatric materials submitted by petitioner concerning his present mental state. 255 0 obj . This combination of factors means that ordinary adversarial procedures — complete with live testimony, cross-examination, and oral argument by counsel — are not necessarily the best means of arriving at sound, consistent judgments as to a defendant's sanity. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979) ("Common human experience and scholarly opinions suggest that the supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical decisions for the commitment and treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory than real").
VIII, ch. If you'd like to help expand it, see the help pages and the style guide, or leave a comment on this work's talk page. 1 N. Walker, Crime and Insanity in England 196 (1968). Citation. In Addington, the Court held that States must require proof by clear and convincing evidence in order to involuntarily commit an individual to a mental hospital for treatment. 11, § 406 (1979); Ind.

A house of _____ was a detention facility that combined the major elements of the workhouse, poorhouse, and penal industry by both disciplining the incarcerated individuals and setting them to work. Code Ann. Code Ann. Law § 655 (McKinney Supp. Cf. Gen. Laws, ch. Ford subsequently refused to see Dr. Amin again, believing him to have joined the conspiracy against him, and Ford's counsel sought assistance from Dr. Harold Kaufman, who interviewed Ford in November 1983. This Court granted Ford's petition for certiorari in order to resolve the important issue whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the insane and, if so, whether the District Court should have … On direct appeal, his conviction and sentence were affirmed, The adequacy of a state-court procedure under, In a habeas corpus proceeding, "a federal evidentiary hearing is required unless the state-court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably found the relevant facts. It follows that the practice of executing the insane is barred by our own Constitution. In my view, however, the only federal question presented in cases such as this is whether the State's positive law has created a liberty interest and whether its procedures are adequate to protect that interest from arbitrary deprivation. 445 U.S. 972 (1980). Second, it notes that "[t]oday, no State in the Union permits the execution of the insane." The adequacy of a state-court procedure under Townsend is largely a function of the circumstances and the interests at stake. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 903 (1983), we can say that the goal of reliability is unlikely to be served by a single group interview, with no provision for the exercise of the psychiatrists' professional judgment regarding the possible need for different or more comprehensive evaluative techniques. Hewitt v. Helms, supra, at 471-472. 0000004182 00000 n

§ 46-14-221 (1984); Neb. 1986). My point is only that if petitioner is cured of his disease, the State is free to execute him. If the defendant perceives the connection between his crime and his punishment, the retributive goal of the criminal law is satisfied. In capital proceedings generally, this Court has demanded that factfinding procedures aspire to a heightened standard of reliability. Get 1 point on adding a valid citation to this judgment. <>/Border[0 0 0]/Rect[81.0 649.194 297.0 661.206]/Subtype/Link/Type/Annot>> See Ala. Code § 15-16-23 (1982); Ariz. Rev. "[T]he minimum assurance that the life-and-death guess will be a truly informed guess requires respect for the basic ingredient of due process, namely, an opportunity to be allowed to substantiate a claim before it is rejected. 0000004021 00000 n I think that the court is correct to find Wainwright guilty.