2009), Cal. Less than 6 months later, on the night of December 2, 2004, Graham again was arrested. But here Graham’s juvenile status—together with the nature of his criminal conduct and the extraordinarily severe punishment imposed—lead me to conclude that his sentence of life without parole is unconstitutional. See Harmelin, supra, at 999 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.) Graham’s parents were addicted to crack cocaine, and their drug use persisted in his early years. The Court first considers "objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice" to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue. Unlike the petitioner in Solem, Graham must establish not only that his own life-without-parole sentence is “grossly disproportionate,” but also that such a sentence is always grossly disproportionate whenever it is applied to a juvenile nonhomicide offender, no matter how heinous his crime. The evidence of consensus is not undermined by the fact that many jurisdictions do not prohibit life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. The restaurant manager required stitches for his head injury. The dilemma of juvenile sentencing demonstrates this. Here, in addressing the question presented, the appropriate analysis is the one used in cases that involved the categorical approach, specifically Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy.
See Stogsdill, Delaware County Teen Sentenced in Rape, Assault Case, Tulsa World, May 4, 2010, p. A12. Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of their lives. 983, 1002–1003 (2008).
the inquiry—an intra- and interjurisdictional compari- Roper, supra, at 629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). With one arguable exception, see Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910); Harmelin, supra, at 990–994 (opinion of Scalia, J.) §§ 7B–2200, 15A–1340.16B(a) (Lexis 2009), N.D. Stat. The State contends that this study's tally is inaccurate because it does not count juvenile offenders who were convicted of both a homicide and a nonhomicide offense, even when the offender received a life without parole sentence for the nonhomicide.
ing for nearly 170 years after the Eighth Amendment’s ratification. 2009); §2C:11–3(b)(2) (West Supp. The trial court found Graham guilty of the earlier armed burglary and attempted armed robbery charges. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S., at 575–578; Atkins, supra, at 316–318, n. 21; Thompson, 487 U.S., at 830 (plurality opinion); Enmund, supra, at 796–797, n. 22; Coker, 433 U.S., at 596, n. 10 (same); Trop, 356 U.S., at 102–103 (same). In the 28 years since Solem, the Court has considered just three such challenges and has rejected them all, see Ewing v. California, 538 U. S. 11 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63 (2003); Harmelin, supra, largely on the theory that criticisms of the “wisdom, cost-efficiency, and effectiveness” of term-of-years prison sentences are “appropriately directed at the legislature[s],” not the courts, Ewing, supra, at 27, 28 (plurality opinion). (a) Embodied in the cruel and unusual punishments ban is the “precept … that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 367. This fact is entirely consistent with the Court’s intuition that juveniles generally are less culpable and more capable of growth than adults. 2009), Mich. Comp. When the manager started yelling at the assailant and Graham, the two youths ran out and escaped in a car driven by the third accomplice. §921.002(1)(e) (2003), a life sentence gives a defendant no possibility of release unless he is granted executive clemency. That same year, 57,600 juveniles were arrested for aggravated assault; 3,580 for forcible rape; 34,500 for robbery; 81,900 for burglary; 195,700 for drug offenses; and 7,200 for arson. But never before today has the Court relied on its own view of just deserts to impose a categorical limit on the imposition of a lesser punishment. As we have said, “successful challenges” to noncapital sentences under the Eighth Amendment have been—and, in my view, should continue to be—“exceedingly rare.” Rummel, 445 U. S., at 272. TERRANCE JAMAR GRAHAM, PETITIONER v. Relying on this metric, the State and its amici argue that there is no national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue. Under the Court’s evolving standards test, “[i]t is not the burden of [a State] to establish a national consensus approving what their citizens have voted to do; rather, it is the ‘heavy burden’ of petitioners to establish a national consensus against it.” Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361, 373 (1989) (quoting Gregg, supra, at 175 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ. As the majority opinion explains, Florida is an outlier in its willingness to impose sentences of life without parole on juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes. It has been rejected before.
(quoting Rummel, 445 U. S., at 282; emphasis added). Similarly, the many States that allow life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders but do not impose the punishment should not be treated as if they have expressed the view that the sentence is appropriate. See Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, The Rest of Their Lives: Life without Parole for Child Offenders in the United States 106, n. 322 (2005); Memorandum and Attachment from Ruth Levush, Law Library of Congress, to Supreme Court Library (Feb. 16, 2010) (available in Clerk of Court’s case file). The classification in turn consists of two subsets, one considering the nature of the offense, the other considering the characteristics of the offender. But “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.” Tison, 481 U. S., at 149. His two accomplices were Meigo Bailey and Kirkland Lawrence, both 20-year-old men. The State acknowledged at oral argument that even a 5-year-old, theoretically, could receive such a sentence under the letter of the law.
[Footnote 7] And although the Court has never decided how many state laws are necessary to show consensus, the Court has never banished into constitutional exile a sentencing practice that the laws of a majority, let alone a supermajority, of States expressly permit. The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide. J.)). § 63–19–1210 (2008 Supp. Harmelin, 501 U. S., at 999 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) The night that Graham allegedly committed the robbery, he was 34 days short of his 18th birthday. §43–21–157 (2009); §§97–3–53, 99–19–81 (2007); §99–19–83 (2006), Neb. The other seven States provide parole eligibility to all offenders, except those who commit certain homicide crimes. Kennedy, 554 U.S., at 441. As compared to adults, juveniles have a " 'lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility' "; they "are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure"; and their characters are "not as well formed." §667.7(a)(2) (1999); §1170.17 (2004), Del.
See Stogsdill, Delaware County Teen Sentenced in Rape, Assault Case, Tulsa World, May 4, 2010, p. A12. Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of their lives. 983, 1002–1003 (2008).
the inquiry—an intra- and interjurisdictional compari- Roper, supra, at 629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). With one arguable exception, see Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910); Harmelin, supra, at 990–994 (opinion of Scalia, J.) §§ 7B–2200, 15A–1340.16B(a) (Lexis 2009), N.D. Stat. The State contends that this study's tally is inaccurate because it does not count juvenile offenders who were convicted of both a homicide and a nonhomicide offense, even when the offender received a life without parole sentence for the nonhomicide.
ing for nearly 170 years after the Eighth Amendment’s ratification. 2009); §2C:11–3(b)(2) (West Supp. The trial court found Graham guilty of the earlier armed burglary and attempted armed robbery charges. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S., at 575–578; Atkins, supra, at 316–318, n. 21; Thompson, 487 U.S., at 830 (plurality opinion); Enmund, supra, at 796–797, n. 22; Coker, 433 U.S., at 596, n. 10 (same); Trop, 356 U.S., at 102–103 (same). In the 28 years since Solem, the Court has considered just three such challenges and has rejected them all, see Ewing v. California, 538 U. S. 11 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63 (2003); Harmelin, supra, largely on the theory that criticisms of the “wisdom, cost-efficiency, and effectiveness” of term-of-years prison sentences are “appropriately directed at the legislature[s],” not the courts, Ewing, supra, at 27, 28 (plurality opinion). (a) Embodied in the cruel and unusual punishments ban is the “precept … that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 367. This fact is entirely consistent with the Court’s intuition that juveniles generally are less culpable and more capable of growth than adults. 2009), Mich. Comp. When the manager started yelling at the assailant and Graham, the two youths ran out and escaped in a car driven by the third accomplice. §921.002(1)(e) (2003), a life sentence gives a defendant no possibility of release unless he is granted executive clemency. That same year, 57,600 juveniles were arrested for aggravated assault; 3,580 for forcible rape; 34,500 for robbery; 81,900 for burglary; 195,700 for drug offenses; and 7,200 for arson. But never before today has the Court relied on its own view of just deserts to impose a categorical limit on the imposition of a lesser punishment. As we have said, “successful challenges” to noncapital sentences under the Eighth Amendment have been—and, in my view, should continue to be—“exceedingly rare.” Rummel, 445 U. S., at 272. TERRANCE JAMAR GRAHAM, PETITIONER v. Relying on this metric, the State and its amici argue that there is no national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue. Under the Court’s evolving standards test, “[i]t is not the burden of [a State] to establish a national consensus approving what their citizens have voted to do; rather, it is the ‘heavy burden’ of petitioners to establish a national consensus against it.” Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361, 373 (1989) (quoting Gregg, supra, at 175 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ. As the majority opinion explains, Florida is an outlier in its willingness to impose sentences of life without parole on juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes. It has been rejected before.
(quoting Rummel, 445 U. S., at 282; emphasis added). Similarly, the many States that allow life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders but do not impose the punishment should not be treated as if they have expressed the view that the sentence is appropriate. See Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, The Rest of Their Lives: Life without Parole for Child Offenders in the United States 106, n. 322 (2005); Memorandum and Attachment from Ruth Levush, Law Library of Congress, to Supreme Court Library (Feb. 16, 2010) (available in Clerk of Court’s case file). The classification in turn consists of two subsets, one considering the nature of the offense, the other considering the characteristics of the offender. But “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.” Tison, 481 U. S., at 149. His two accomplices were Meigo Bailey and Kirkland Lawrence, both 20-year-old men. The State acknowledged at oral argument that even a 5-year-old, theoretically, could receive such a sentence under the letter of the law.
[Footnote 7] And although the Court has never decided how many state laws are necessary to show consensus, the Court has never banished into constitutional exile a sentencing practice that the laws of a majority, let alone a supermajority, of States expressly permit. The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide. J.)). § 63–19–1210 (2008 Supp. Harmelin, 501 U. S., at 999 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) The night that Graham allegedly committed the robbery, he was 34 days short of his 18th birthday. §43–21–157 (2009); §§97–3–53, 99–19–81 (2007); §99–19–83 (2006), Neb. The other seven States provide parole eligibility to all offenders, except those who commit certain homicide crimes. Kennedy, 554 U.S., at 441. As compared to adults, juveniles have a " 'lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility' "; they "are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure"; and their characters are "not as well formed." §667.7(a)(2) (1999); §1170.17 (2004), Del.