1, §31(a), states in full: “The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.” See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F. 3d 692 (CA9 1997). It is an atmosphere in which there prevail ‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university—to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.’   ” Id., at 263 (citation omitted). v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978). Strict scrutiny is not “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, supra, at 237 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Ibid. Ibid. He indicated that critical mass means numbers such that underrepresented minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race.

FAQ | The rallying cry that in the absence of racial discrimination in admissions there would be a true meritocracy ignores the fact that the entire process is poisoned by numerous exceptions to “merit.” For example, in the national debate on racial discrimination in higher education admissions, much has been made of the fact that elite institutions utilize a so-called “legacy” preference to give the children of alumni an advantage in admissions. In Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429 (1984), the Court held that even the best interests of a child did not constitute a compelling state interest that would allow a state court to award custody to the father because the mother was in a mixed-race marriage. The Court suggests a possible 25-year limitation on the Law School’s current program.

The majority admits as much: “We take the Law School at its word that it would ‘like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula’ and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as practicable.” Ante, at 30 (quoting Brief for Respondent Bollinger et al. As the Harvard plan described by Justice Powell recognized, there is of course “some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, and between numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those students admitted.” Id., at 323. Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper institutional mission, and that “good faith” on the part of a university is “presumed” absent “a showing to the contrary.” 438 U. S., at 318–319. The United States does not, however, explain how such plans could work for graduate and professional schools. The Court never explicitly holds that the Law School’s desire to retain the status quo in “academic selectivity” is itself a compelling state interest, and, as I have demonstrated, it is not. Not only do respondents fail to explain this phenomenon, they attempt to obscure it. Grutter v. Bollinger, a case decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 23, 2003, upheld the affirmative action admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School.
Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161.
The bonus factor of race would then become divorced from individual review; it would be premised instead on the numerical objective set by the Law School. See App.

I believe what lies beneath the Court’s decision today are the benighted notions that one can tell when racial discrimination benefits (rather than hurts) minority groups, see Adarand, 515 U. S., at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), and that racial discrimination is necessary to remedy general societal ills. See ABA–LSAC Guide 426 (reporting that the Law School has 46 black women and 28 black men). The obvious tension between the pursuit of critical mass and the requirement of individual review increased by the end of the admissions season.

The Court’s civics lesson presents yet another example of judicial selection of a theory of political representation based on skin color—an endeavor I have previously rejected. as Amici Curiae 27. of Ga., 263 F. 3d 1234 (CA11 2001). More important, for the reasons set out below, today we endorse Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions. Nor does this case necessitate reconsideration whether interests other than “student body diversity,” ante, at 13, rank as sufficiently important to justify a race-conscious government program. Admittedly, there were greater fluctuations among enrolled minorities in the preceding years, 1987–1994, by as much as 5 or 6%.

2. If the Court defers to the Law School’s judgment that a racially mixed student body confers educational benefits to all, then why would the Wygant Court not defer to the school board’s judgment with respect to the benefits a racially mixed faculty confers? 404–406 (1959) (emphasis added). 43. In other words, an admissions program must be “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight.” Ibid. Supreme Court of United States. Ante, at 30 (quoting Nathanson & Bartnika, The Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment for Minority Applicants to Professional Schools, 58 Chicago Bar Rec. I join the Court’s opinion insofar as it confirms that this type of racial discrimination remains unlawful. The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all. The Law School does neither.

Nor is the policy “insensitive to the competition among all students for admission to the [L]aw [S]chool.” Ibid. And at Mississippi Valley State University, a public HBC, only 1.1% of the freshman class in 2001 was white. This case requires us to decide whether the use of race as a factor in student admissions by the University of Michigan Law School (Law School) is unlawful. This article predates the author's affiliation with Cornell Law School. And therefore: If it is appropriate for the University of Michigan Law School to use racial discrimination for the purpose of putting together a “critical mass” that will convey generic lessons in socialization and good citizenship, surely it is no less appropriate—indeed, particularly appropriate—for the civil service system of the State of Michigan to do so.