Like the illegal entry which led to discovery of the evidence in today's case, the illegal arrest in Harris began a process that culminated in acquisition of the evidence sought to be excluded. Officers then stayed in the apartment for 19 hours awaiting a search warrant.

The majority rests this conclusion on its next statement: "Whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police .

Hudson Harloff Michigan, Recipient Hudson Harloff’s body isn’t able to produce red blood cells, so every couple of weeks the toddler needs a blood transfusion to stay alive. Why is application of the exclusionary rule any the less necessary here? might as well be stricken from the Constitution."

Public Defender

495 U.S., at 16.

In Wilson, tracing the lineage of the knock-and-announce rule back to the 13th century, 514 U.S., at 932, and n. 2, we wrote that, We noted that this "basic principle" was agreed upon by "[s]everal prominent founding-era commentators," id., at 932, *606 and "was woven quickly into the fabric of early American law" via state constitutions and statutes, id., at 933. It would be another 17 years before the § 1983 remedy was extended to reach the deep pocket of municipalities, Monell v. New York City Dept. The Court nonetheless accepts Michigan's argument that the requisite but-for causation is not satisfied in this case because, whether or not the constitutional violation occurred (what the Court refers to as a "preliminary misstep"), "the police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the *616 house." would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the house."

Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S., at 444 (emphasis added). United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 72, n. 3 (1998) (application of the exclusionary rule depends on the existence of a "sufficient causal relationship" between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence). The majority adds that police officers about to encounter someone who may try to harm them will be "uncertain" as to how long to wait. An officer knocked. In this case, of course, the constitutional violation of an illegal manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence.

Rather, "independent" or "inevitable" discovery refers to discovery that did occur or that would have occurred (1) despite (not simply in the absence of) the unlawful behavior and (2) independently of that unlawful behavior. They then used a hotel key to open the door and enter. JUSTICE BREYER'S assertion that Segura, unlike our decision in the present case, had no effect on deterrence, see post, at 625-626, does not comport with the views of the Segura dissent. Why is that judicial judgment, taken on its own, inappropriate? *587 David A. Moran argued and reargued the cause for petitioner. Ante, at 592. Hawaii . Harris, 495 U. S., at 17 ("Payton itself *628 emphasized that our holding in that case stemmed from the `overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic'"). Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). The appeals court ruled that the drugs the officers subsequently found were inadmissible in court. Although the police might have entered Hudson's home lawfully, they did not in fact do so. Virginia And where a search is unlawful, the law insists upon suppression of the evidence consequently discovered, even if that evidence or its possession has little or nothing to do with the reasons underlying the unconstitutionality of a search. The majority's "substantial social costs" argument is an argument against the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary principle itself. And Michigan's amici further concede that civil immunities prevent tort law from being an effective substitute for the exclusionary rule at this time. The issue is whether evidence seized during the search should be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. 0000027262 00000 n There is also evidence that the increasing use of various forms of citizen review can enhance police accountability. Your email address will not be published. What reason is there to believe that those remedies (such as private damages actions under Rev. Vermont ("The valid warrant search was a `means sufficiently distinguishable' to purge the evidence of any `taint' arising from the entry"). Richards, 520 U. S., at 396, n. 7 (collecting state statutes). 0000074501 00000 n He renewed his Fourth Amendment claim on appeal, but the Court of Appeals rejected it and affirmed the conviction.

. denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000), and People v. Vasquez, 602 N.W.2d 376 (1999), which held that the inevitable discovery doctrine of Nix v. See supra, at 608-610.

We refused to exclude it.

is `an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking *592 to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.'" Excluding relevant incriminating evidence results in the release of dangerous criminals. Third Circuit It says that, "[i]f the consequences of running afoul" of the knock-and-announce "rule were so massive," i. e., would lead to the exclusion of evidence, then "officers would be inclined to wait longer than the law requires—producing preventable violence against officers in some cases." For years after Mapp, "very few lawyers would even consider representation of persons who had civil rights claims against the police," but now "much has changed. . See 495 U.S., at 15-16. Iowa Officers can enter a home without permission, either with or without force, only after they have been refused entry or waited a sufficient amount of time without receiving a response. Cf. 338 U.S., at 27-28. Cf.

The search that produced the relevant evidence here is the very search that the knock-and-announce violation rendered unlawful. The threat of inadmissibility deters unlawful police behavior; and the existence of an exception applicable where evidence is found through an untainted independent route will rarely undercut that deterrence. 1984). The Court held that the Government could not use information obtained during an illegal search to subpoena documents that they illegally viewed during that search. Colorado See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). This claim, however, misunderstands the inevitable discovery doctrine. Antonin Scalia. . This case has been cited by these opinions: The following opinions cover similar topics: CourtListener is a project of Free It protects the occupants' privacy by assuring them that government agents will not enter their home without complying with those requirements (among others) that diminish the offensive nature of any such intrusion. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Second Circuit Georgia The “knock-notice” or “knock-and-announce” rule originates from the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The second set of cases sets forth certain well-established principles that are relevant here. When, for example, a violation results from want of a 20-second pause but an ensuing, lawful search lasting five hours discloses evidence *604 of criminality, the failure to wait at the door cannot properly be described as having caused the discovery of evidence. I accordingly join those Parts and concur in the judgment. Thus, in New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990), where an illegal warrantless arrest was made in Harris's house, we held: For this reason, cases excluding the fruits of unlawful warrantless searches, see, e. g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Weeks, 232 U.S. 383; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Mapp, supra, say nothing about the appropriateness of exclusion to vindicate the interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement.

If those measures prove ineffective, they can be fortified with more detailed regulations or legislation. See Part III—B, supra. ", Just another Wiki Encyclopedia of Law Project (BETA) Sites site, (2006). ("Experience [in California] has demonstrated, however, that neither administrative, criminal nor civil remedies are effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures"). The Court consequently held that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." 1994); E. Thibault, L. Lynch, & R. McBride, Proactive Police Management (4th ed.

04-1360. See also id., at 829 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("We have not . Security must not be subject to erosion by indifference or contempt. We require only that police "have a reasonable suspicion . Then he says that, "[i]f the probable cause backing a warrant that was issued later in time could be an `independent source' for a search that proceeded after the officers illegally entered and waited, a search warrant obtained before going in must have at least this much effect." This common understanding ensures respect for the law and allegiance to our institutions, and it is an instrument for transmitting our Constitution to later generations undiminished in meaning and force. In other words, exclusion may not be premised on the mere fact that a constitutional violation was a "but-for" cause of obtaining evidence. As importantly, the Court in Segura said nothing to suggest it intended to create a major exclusionary rule exception, notwithstanding the impact of such an exception on deterrence.

0