However, in Sanders, the court pointed out:", " Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, or to entertain collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay. ears open" for the names of the other perpetrators.

This Court therefore must now define the considerations that should govern federal courts' disposition of successive petitions for habeas corpus. and the informant, the informant's engaging the defendant "in active conversation about their upcoming trial was certain to elicit" incriminating statements from the defendant. After his arraignment on charges arising from a 1970 robbery and murder in New York, respondent was confined in a cell with a prisoner, named Benny Lee, who had previously agreed to act as a police … Although the informant had not questioned the defendant, the informant had "stimulated" conversations with the defendant in order to "elicit" incriminating information. Footnote 21

Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment "imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the accused's choice to First, this standard requires the federal courts to function in much the same capacity as the state trier of fact -- the federal courts must make a rough decision on the question of guilt or innocence.

In 1867, Congress authorized the federal courts to grant habeas relief to persons in the custody of the States. App.

2 Lee informed Cullen of respondent's statements and furnished Cullen with notes that he had written surreptitiously while sharing the cell with respondent. U.S. 443, 497 But I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN that this is not an essential element of every just disposition of a successive petition.

373 During that [respondent] served to exacerbate [respondent's] already troubled state of Since 1966, the burden imposed by applications for federal habeas corpus filed by state prisoners has continued to increase. U.S. 436, 465] Id. Powell Papers. Today four Members of the Court argue that we should reject Sanders' "sound discretion" standard, and contend that the ends of justice are served by reconsideration of issues raised in previous federal habeas petitions only where the prisoner can make a colorable showing of factual innocence. 15

Where the prisoner secures his release on a successive petition, the delay between the crime and retrial following issuance of the writ often will be substantial. 472 I agree fully with the Court's opinion and judgment. No. Id., at 165-166, and n. 4.
HOLDING: No. and that under state precedent Henry was not to be given retroactive effect, see People v. Pepper, 53 N. Y. U.S. 436, 453]

Whether one characterizes those decisions as carving out an "exception" to federal habeas jurisdiction, as the dissent apparently prefers to do, post at 477 U. S. 465, n. 3, or as concerning the scope of that jurisdiction, the result is the same, and was reached under a framework of analysis that weighed the pertinent interests.
  Second, the legislative history of the Rules Governing Section 2254 demonstrates that in adopting Rule 9(b) Congress expressly endorsed the existing case law governing subsequent petitions and cited Sanders. U.S. 436, 458].

1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. Shortly before, employees of the garage had observed We rejected the Government's argument that because Henry initiated the discussion of his crime, no Sixth Amendment violation had occurred. The dissent states that the plurality, "implies that federal habeas review is not available as a matter of right to a prisoner who alleges in his first federal petition a properly preserved [constitutional claim].". On September 11, 1981, he filed in state trial court a motion to vacate his conviction. In other words, we have recognized an exception to the exercise of federal jurisdiction in the unusual cases where respect for the procedures of state courts make this appropriate; such an exception is similar to abstention rules. Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. question whether the Sixth Amendment forbids admission in evidence of an . [Footnote 21] Significantly, the Court emphasized that, because of the relationship between the defendant. . . Subsequent cases have uniformly construed Stone v. Powell as creating a special rule only for Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims and have repeatedly refused to extend its limitations on federal habeas review to any other context. [Footnote 2/7]. Cullen instructed Lee not to ask respondent any questions, but simply to "keep his ears open" for the names of the other perpetrators. at odds with the facts found by the trial court. presence." 142, 148-149 (1970). However, specific guidance should be given to the federal courts as to the kind of proof that a state prisoner must offer to establish that the "ends of justice" will be served by relitigation.

The decision whether to hear a successive petition, we stated, was committed "to the sound discretion of the federal trial judges." U.S. 264 Id., at 327. The Court in Massiah 377 Ante, at 454; see also ante, at 448-452. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. cannot be too finely particularized," 373 U.S. at 373 U. S. 17, and, in recognition of this fact, we left it to the "sound discretion" of federal trial judges to make case-by-case determinations of what the ends of justice require. U.S. 264   being blamed for the crimes. Agreeing with the Court that the confession was involuntary, and thus improperly admitted in evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment, the concurring Justices also took the position that the defendant's right to counsel was violated by the secret interrogation. This case involves, and our opinion describes, only the standard applicable to successive petitions for federal habeas corpus relief. Agreeing with the Court that Ante at 477 U. S. 440; Wilson v. Henderson, 82 Civ. Rather, the Court simply "reaffirm[ed] that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy rather than a personal constitutional right .   22 As we stated just two Terms ago, there is, "no doubt that, in enacting § 2254, Congress sought to", "interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights -- to protect the people from unconstitutional action.". 447 at 428 U. S. 492, n. 31. [477 .

Respondent admitted that he had been present when the crimes took It is violated, however, when "the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent." Id. In support of this standard for consideration of successive petitions, the plurality advances a revisionist theory of this Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence. In § 2244(a), which now governs successive petitions filed by federal prisoners, Congress preserved virtually intact the language of former § 2244, including the reference to the "ends of justice. . changed details of his original account. ] Contrary to the suggestion of JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent, our cases deciding that federal habeas review ordinarily does not extend to procedurally defaulted claims plainly concern the "general scope of the writ." Before respondent arrived in the jail, Lee had entered into an arrangement with Detective Cullen, according to which Lee agreed to listen to respondent's conversations and report his remarks to Cullen. [477 As an initial matter, the court stated that, under Sanders v. United States, Wilson… The prisoner must make his evidentiary showing even though - as argued in this case - the evidence of guilt may have been unlawfully admitted. The Senate Report incorporates a letter from Senior Circuit Judge Orie L. Phillips to Senator Joseph D. Tydings that states: "The need for this legislation . 441, 452 (1963).