See Cowan, Thompson, & Ellsworth, supra, at 68-69; see also R. Hastie, S. Penrod, & N. Pennington, Inside the Jury 66 (1983); H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 488 (1966).

Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750, 761-762 (CA7 1976), cert. denied, L. Rev. I dissent. Here's why 401,000 law students have relied on our case briefs: Are you a current student of ? U.S., at 638 U.S. 412 (1980), it may be difficult to classify a particular verdict as "accurate" or "inaccurate." The Court of Appeals described the following studies as "attitudinal and demographic surveys": Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qualified Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U.Colo.L.Rev.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives by Allan Blumstein and Eric M. Freedman; for Robert Popper et al. See Grigsby v. Mabry, supra, at 237 ("[I]t is the courts who have often stood in the way of surveys involving real jurors, and we should not now reject a study because of this deficiency"). In this case we address the question left open by our decision nearly 18 years ago in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968): … and none of the "new" studies was able to predict to what extent, if any, the presence of one or more "Witherspoon-excludables" on a He does not claim that pretrial publicity, see Rideau v. Louisiana, [ at 243-251.

That is as it should be, for the two questions are necessarily interwoven.". The Eighth Circuit found "substantial evidentiary support" for the District Court's conclusion that the removal for cause of "Witherspoon-excludables" resulted in "conviction-prone" juries, and affirmed the grant of habeas relief on the ground that such removal for cause violated McCree's constitutional right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community. Guided by neither rule nor standard, 'free to select or reject as it [sees] fit,' a jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little more -- and must do nothing less -- than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death. You can try any plan risk-free for 7 days. Get Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988), United States Supreme Court, case facts, key issues, and holdings and reasonings online today. The jury convicted respondent, but, at the sentencing phase of the trial, it rejected the State's request for the death penalty and set punishment at life imprisonment without parole. Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy. Lockhart, the director of the Arkansas Department of Correction, appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. . The State's mere announcement that it intends to seek the death penalty if the defendant is found guilty of a capital offense will, under today's decision, give the prosecution license to empanel a jury especially likely to return that very verdict. See 569 F.Supp. Get Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), United States Supreme Court, case facts, key issues, and holdings and reasonings online today.

Read our student testimonials. Tr. Cowan, Thompson, & Ellsworth, 8 Law & Hum.Behav.

Finally, such exclusion improperly deprived members of these often historically disadvantaged groups of their right as citizens to serve on juries in criminal cases. . Yet even after considering the evidence adduced by the State, the Court of Appeals properly noted: "there are no studies which contradict the studies submitted [by respondent]; in other words, all of the documented studies support the district court's findings. 1 You're using an unsupported browser.

McCree argued that his right to an impartial jury selected from a representative cross-section of the community was violated and cited empirical studies that suggest death-qualified juries are conviction prone. Batson v. Kentucky, ante, at 84-85, n. 4 (expressly declining to address "fair-cross-section" challenge to discriminatory use of peremptory challenges). Ibid. See Ark.Stat.Ann.

Supp., at 1277, n. 2. See n. 8, infra. [Footnote 9] We have serious doubts about the value of these studies in predicting the behavior of actual jurors. § 41-1358 (Supp.1985). ("The point at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the community is when the names are put in the box from which the panels are drawn"), vacated on other grounds, L. Rev. (1984).

by Michael C. Turpen, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and David W. Lee, Hugh A. Manning, Tomilou Gentry Liddell, Robert A. Nance, and Jean M. LeBlanc, Assistant Attorneys General, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, John Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Charles M. Oberly, Attorney General of Delaware, David L. Armstrong, Attorney General of Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland, Robert M. Spire, Attorney General of Nebraska, Brian McKay, Attorney General of Nevada, Stephen E. Merrill, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, W. J. Michael Cody, Attorney General of Tennessee, David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General of Utah, William G. Broaddus, Attorney General of Virginia, and Archie G. McClintock, Attorney General of Wyoming. Yet even after considering the evidence adduced by the State, the Court of Appeals properly noted: "there are no studies which contradict the studies submitted [by respondent]; in other words, all of the documented studies support the district court's findings." Under Witt, a juror who does not make his attitude toward capital punishment "unmistakably clear," Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 522, n. 21, may nonetheless be excluded for cause if the trial court is left with the impression that his attitude will "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'" 419 The chief strength of respondent's evidence lies in the essential unanimity of the results obtained by researchers using diverse subjects and varied methodologies. The Cowan-Deliberation study revealed that approximately 37% of the "Witherspoon-excludables" identified in the study were also "nullifiers.". The Court advanced several explanations for this phenomenon: "As juries decrease in size .

[476 See Brief for Respondent 74-79. 1, 39 (1982).

Beck v. Alabama,

385, 395, 659 S.W.2d 168, 173 (1983), cert. Finally, the removal for cause of "Witherspoon-excludables" in capital cases does not prevent them from serving as jurors in other criminal cases, and thus leads to no substantial deprivation of their basic rights of citizenship. U.S., at 518 1 (1970); Bronson, Does the Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors in Capital Cases Make the Jury More Likely to Convict? See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 438 U. S. 597 (1978) ("Nothing in Taylor, however, suggests that the right to a representative jury includes the right to be tried by jurors who have explicitly indicated an inability to follow the law and instructions of the trial judge"). 385, 396-397, 659 S.W.2d 168, 173-174 (1983), cert. Ante, at 176, n. 16. The District Court ruled that "death qualification" of the jury prior to the guilt phase of the bifurcated trial violated both the fair cross section and the impartiality requirements of the Constitution. 448 U.S. at 448 U. S. 54 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). rights of criminal defendants and more likely to doubt the strength of the prosecution's case.

", "It is, of course, settled that a State may not entrust the determination of whether a man is innocent or guilty to a tribunal 'organized to convict.' Witherspoon placed limits on the State's ability to strike scrupled jurors for cause, unless they state "unambiguously that [they] would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment no matter what the trial might reveal," 84-1865. Thus, according to respondent, even though a nonbiased selection procedure might have left him with a jury composed of the very same chanrobles.com-red. COVID-19 resources for psychologists, health-care workers and the public.

McCree (defendant) was charged with capital felony murder. Some law schools—such as Yale, Vanderbilt, Berkeley, and the University of Illinois—even subscribe directly to Quimbee for all their law students. Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 332 U. S. 294 [1947]. As the Witherspoon Court recognized, "the State's interest in submitting the penalty issue to a jury capable of imposing capital punishment" may be accommodated without infringing a capital defendant's interest in a fair determination of his guilt if the State uses "one jury to decide guilt and another to The role of a jury in criminal cases, however, is not limited to the determination of historical facts.