See supra, at 11–12. The only question left—and the only one on which the parties now disagree—is whether Madison’s execution may go forward based on the state court’s decision below. NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 2014). As Ford and Panetti recognized, a delusional disorder can be of such severity—can “so impair the prisoner’s concept of reality”—that someone in its thrall will be unable “to come to grips with” the punishment’s meaning. See Tr. For example, in 2006, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) released a recommended test for determining competency for execution. Madison consistently presented with paranoid delusions’ ”); id., at 8 (“Mr. But as described above, Alabama had repeatedly argued to the court (over Madison’s objection) that only prisoners suffering from delusional disorders could qualify as incompetent under Panetti. Those principles, the Panetti Court explained, indicate how to identify prisoners whom the State may not execute.
1. But whether or not the petition may be fairly read to present that factbound question, it is a travesty to read it as challenging the state-court order on the ground that the state court erroneously believed that dementia cannot provide a basis for a Ford/Panetti claim. of Oral Arg. We should do that here. Another rationale rested on the lack of “retributive value” in executing a person who has no comprehension of the meaning of the community’s judgment.

for Suspension in No.

While awaiting execution, he suffered a series of strokes and was diagnosed with vascular dementia. for Suspension in No. Quarterman. 17–7505. (Madison “failed to implicate” Ford and Panetti because he “does not suffer from psychosis or delusions”). Recall that our decision there held the Eighth Amendment to forbid executing a prisoner whose mental illness makes him unable to “reach a rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution.” 551 U. S., at 958; see supra, at 2–3. As noted earlier, the 2018 ruling we review today contains only one sentence of explanation. And they indicated that an execution offends morality in the same circumstance. And to top things off, the majority’s argument distorts what the State’s brief in opposition attempted to say about the term “insane.” The State did not argue that a defendant who lacks a rational understanding of the reason for his execution due to dementia is not “insane” under Ala. Code §15–16–23. And in fact, there is a point in the petition where such an interpretation of the state-court order would surely have been mentioned if the petition had intended to raise it as a ground for review. But you may still be able to reach a rational—indeed, a sophisticated—understanding of that conflict and its consequences. See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Centers L. P. v. Clark, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 9) (remanding when “uncertain” whether “an impermissible taint occurred”); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 751–752 (1990) (similar). of Oral Arg.

(The dissent similarly begins with the 2016 ruling, see post, at 6–7, even though that is not the decision under review here.) In his petition, Madison reiterated the facts and arguments he had previously presented to the state court. It found that petitioner “ha[d] not carried his burden [of showing] by a preponderance of the evidence . In that submission, the State argued that certiorari should be denied because petitioner had sought relief in state court under the wrong provision of state law, namely, Ala. Code §15–16–23 (2011), which authorizes the suspension of the execution of an inmate who is “insane.” The State argued that petitioner’s memory loss did not render him “insane” within the meaning of this statute and that if he wished to argue that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of an inmate who cannot remember his crime, he “should have filed a peti tion for post-conviction relief” under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4. See 551 U. S., at 958–959 (citing 477 U. S., at 407–408); supra, at 3.

Echoing Ford, Panetti reasoned that execution has no retributive value when a prisoner cannot appreciate the meaning of a community’s judgment. for Cert. they don’t have delusions”). [8] See Jess Bravin, Supreme Court Grapples with Planned Execution of Convicted Killer with Dementia, Wall Street J.

(And for that reason—contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, post, at 12—our decision on Madison’s habeas petition cannot help resolve the questions raised here.).

Do evolving standards of decency and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment bar the execution of a prisoner whose competency has been compromised by vascular dementia and multiple strokes causing severe cognitive dysfunction and a degenerative medical condition which prevents him from remembering the crime for which he was convicted or understanding the circumstances of his scheduled execution? See Brief for Petitioner 16.

[20], While this result was a victory for Madison and provides some clarification as to the “rational understanding” standard, the standard is still too unclear in application.
See id., at 962. The state court, we have little doubt, can evaluate such matters better than we.

for Cert. And,  the State continues, the 2016 opinion gets the law right. 12–14. (The State made this argument because petitioner’s counsel claimed that petitioner was in fact delusional and fell within Ford and Panetti for that reason.3) But arguing, as the State did, that petitioner  was not entitled to relief because the claim that he was delusional was untrue is not the same as arguing that petitioner could be executed even if his dementia rendered him incapable of understanding the reason for his execution. The state court’s (supposed) echoing of statutory language understood in that way cannot provide assurance that the court knew a person with dementia might receive a stay of execution; indeed, it suggests exactly the opposite. That mental condition can cause such disorientation and cognitive decline as to prevent a person from sustaining a rational understanding of why the State wants to execute him.

83. Kavanaugh, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 4–5, 8. 1 (Apr. “2. 39; supra, at 5–6.

16–12279 (CA11, June 23, 2016), at 26:36–26:45 (“In this case, what we have is someone who claims to have a mental illness, dementia,” but does not have “delusions, which is what Panetti requires”); id., at 26:48–27:21 (When asked if someone with “severe dementia” but no delusions could be executed, the State responded “I think so because . [25] See Symposium, Competency for Execution: The Implications of a Communicative Model of Retribution, 76 Tenn. L. Rev. The Panetti standard focuses on whether a mental disorder has had a particular effect; it has no interest in establishing any precise cause. Today’s decision does not reject this interpretation of the state-court order; it says only that it is vacating and remanding because it is “at the least unsure” whether the state court used the term “insanity” in this way. But if your mother told you years later that you were sent home for hitting a classmate, you would have no trouble grasping the story. Brief in Opposition 11–12.

4  Alternatively, however, the term may also be used to encompass persons with other mental conditions, so long as they are “severe enough [to] prevent[ ] a person from having legal capacity and excuse[ ] the person from criminal or civil responsibility.” Black’s Law Dictionary 914 (10th ed. But we come away at the least unsure whether that is so—especially given Alabama’s evidence and arguments in the state court. (referring to the state court’s “finding that Madison understands both that he was tried and imprisoned for murder and that Alabama will put him to death as punishment for that crime”). We explained, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s principal holding, that “[n]either Panetti nor Ford ‘clearly established’ that a prisoner is incompetent to be executed” because of a simple failure to remember his crime.