maryland v pringle

set of legal rules.” Gates, 462 U.S., at 232. and gave an oral and written confession in which he The Court's decision in Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999), is to the same effect. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 304-305; Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-414.

a. Established pursuant to Article III of the U.S. Constitution in 1789, it has original jurisdiction over a narrow range of cases, including suits between two or more states and those involving ambassadors. 27, §594B

The officer returned to the stopped car, had Partlow get out, and issued him an oral warning. App. The Court thus viewed the case as "tantamount to one in which the guns were lying on the floor or the seat of the car in the plain view of the three other occupants."

21a.

444 U.S. at 91. While it is not reasonable to infer that persons who merely "talk to narcotic addicts are engaged in the criminal traffic in narcotics," id. Following a hearing, the trial court denied respondent's motion. that there was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the

2a-3a. The "Fourth Amendment accepts [the] risk" that "persons arrested and detained on probable cause to believe they have committed a crime may turn out to be innocent." The judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals is reversed. An officer deciding whether to make a warrantless arrest frequently confronts an uncertain and evolving situation. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), is a Supreme Court of the United States case regarding the reasonableness of the arrest of a passenger in an automobile. that the officer, upon recovering the five plastic glassine Even if another passenger had concealed the drugs in the rear seat, it was reasonable to infer that the passenger acted in furtherance of the occupants' common interest in avoiding apprehension. “possession” as “the exercise of actual or 6 If the narcotics are found concealed on the person of an occupant or in a locked and stowed compartment only accessible to the driver, there may be less reason to infer that all passengers were aware of the existence of the contraband. that “[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable contexts–not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat 124 S. Ct. 795; 157 L. Ed.

The jury found respondent guilty of possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute it. at 41a-42a. 332 U.S. at 593. ").11 In the context of narcotics trafficking, moreover, the crime is likely part of a continuing pattern rather than an isolated incident, magnifying the interest in facilitating arrest and prosecution to prevent future offenses. e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), is a United States Supreme Court case which held that, based on the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may not conduct a warrantless search of a third party's home in an attempt to apprehend the subject of an arrest warrant, absent consent or exigent circumstances.

The contrary conclusion of the Maryland Court of Appeals cannot be squared with the practical and non-technical inquiry demanded by the probable cause standard. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. suspicion.’ More recently, we said that ‘the Because the officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle, the arrest did not contravene the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the 13 In any event, even with respect to the particular offense elements of knowledge and control, the location of the drugs and roll of money within respondent's reach presented strong circumstantial evidence that he was aware of the presence of the cocaine and could exercise constructive control over it. No such singling out occurred in this

See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 230–231 (1983) (opining that the totality of the circumstances approach is consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175–176 (1949) (“Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed”).

The discovery of the money and drugs in separate locations in the car might have bolstered that inference, indicating to Officer Snyder that the various passengers were working together. h, at 196 (1965). men, not legal technicians, act.’ ” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 Inside a cigarette pack retrieved from Ybarra’s pocket, an officer found six tinfoil packets containing heroin. After all three men denied ownership of the cocaine and money, the officer arrested each of them.

(1949).

to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor Citation. The majority ruled that, "[w]ithout additional facts available to the officer that would tend to establish [respondent's] knowledge and dominion or control over the drugs, the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when [respondent] was a front seat passenger in a car being driven by its owner is insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest for possession." In Sibron, the Court ruled that there was no probable cause to arrest an individual solely on the basis that he had conversations with several drug addicts in the course of an eight-hour period.

Pringle’s attempt to characterize this case as a guilt-by-association case is unavailing. To determine whether an officer had probable cause to make an arrest, a court must examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide "whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to" probable cause. Those two occupants were then released. may be made before the preliminary print goes to 10 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), does not suggest otherwise.

8 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), which the Court cited in Ybarra (444 U.S. at 91), is not pertinent to this case. officer’s presence.

Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), is a Supreme Court of the United States case regarding the reasonableness of the arrest of a passenger in an automobile. In United States criminal law, probable cause is the standard by which police authorities have reason to obtain a warrant for the arrest of a suspected criminal or the issuing of a search warrant. the officer’s presence, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if search or seize another or to search the premises where the 9 The government had not called the informer as a witness in Di Re's trial or shown that the informer was unavailable, leading the Court to "assume that [the informer's] testimony would not have been helpful in bringing guilty knowledge home to Di Re." 2. A police officer stopped a car for speeding at 3:16 a.m.; searched the car, seizing $763 from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest; and arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest We think it is men. 38a. A jury convicted Pringle of possession of drugs with the intent to distribute. in Opp. therefore did not contravene the Fourth and Fourteenth All three then were arrested and transported to the police station. A reasonable police officer can conclude that probable cause existed to arrest a front-seat passenger for possession of drugs found in the back-seat of the car. Although respondent was seated in the front seat and the drugs were found in the rear seat, both the cash and the drugs were within his arm's reach.

Under the "practical, common-sense judgment called for in making a probable-cause determination," Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 (1983), the discovery of a commercial quantity of cocaine and a bundle of cash in the passenger compartment of an automobile affords probable cause for arresting each of the occupants.