. Upon review, the Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the testimony was other-acts evidence as contemplated by MRE 404(b), and that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. The Court then stated: [

. 13, 21, 150 N. E. 585, 587 (1926). More generally, however, Sixth Amendment principles require that we impute the State's knowledge from one state actor to another. In our opinion, however, the reasons for prohibiting the interrogation of an uncounseled prisoner who has asked for the help of a lawyer are even stronger after he has been formally charged with an offense than before. : 84-1531 DECIDED BY: Burger Court (1981-1986) LOWER COURT: Michigan Supreme Court CITATION: 475 US 625 (1986) ARGUED: Dec 09, 1985 DECIDED: Apr 01, 1986 ADVOCATES: Brian E. Thiede - on behalf of the Petitioner James Krogsrud - on behalf of Respondent Robert Bernard Jackson …

What the Court today either forgets or chooses to ignore is that the "constitutional guarantee" referred to in Solem v. Stumes is the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on compelled self-incrimination. [475 My disagreement with the Court stems from our differing understandings of Edwards. 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 484. Although the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, The Court phrases the question presented in these cases as whether the Edwards rule applies "to a defendant who has been formally charged with a crime and who has requested appointment of counsel at his arraignment." Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. 159 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964). The problem with the limitation the Court places on the Sixth Amendment version of the Edwards rule is that, unlike a defendant's "right to counsel" under Miranda, which does not arise until affirmatively invoked by the defendant during custodial interrogation, a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not depend at all on whether the defendant has requested counsel. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), we held that an accused person in custody who has, "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.".  

The State also relies on the factual differences between a request for counsel during custodial interrogation and a request for counsel at an arraignment. . -470 (1981) (quoting Kirby); Moore v. Illinois,

114 Mich.App. 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 484, we appended this footnote: "In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977), where, as in Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had accrued, the Court held that a valid waiver of counsel rights should not be inferred from the mere response by the accused to overt or more subtle forms of interrogation or other efforts to elicit incriminating information. He was arrested again on March 22, 1979, and agreed to talk to the police that evening without counsel.

The Michigan Supreme Court then granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal, and considered the case with respondent Jackson's appeal of his conviction.

451 118 Mich. App. Maine v. Moulton, Edwards flows from the Fifth Amendment's right to counsel at custodial interrogations, the State argues; its relevance to the Sixth Amendment's provision of the assistance of counsel is far less clear, and thus the Edwards principle for assessing waivers is unnecessary and inappropriate. . See, e.g., Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S. 91, 469 U. S. 98 (1984); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 646; Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U. S. 1039, 462 U. S. 1044 (1983) (plurality opinion); id.

there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be eradicated in the foreseeable future.". [Footnote 2/4], This leaves the Court, however, in an analytical straitjacket. 451 U. S., at 484. In either case, the question is one of waiver"). [9] Accordingly, it affirmed Jackson's conviction of murder, although it set aside the conspiracy conviction on unrelated grounds. ] In construing respondents' request for counsel, we do not, of course, suggest that the right to counsel turns on such a request. The Court acknowledges as much in footnote six of its opinion, where it stresses that "we do not, of course, suggest that See

With him on the brief was James R. Neuhard. Indeed, after a formal accusation has been made — and a person who had previously been just a "suspect" has become an "accused" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment — the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is of such importance that the police may no longer employ techniques for eliciting information from an uncounseled defendant that might have been entirely proper at an earlier stage of their investigation.

  ] We also agree with the comments of the Michigan Supreme Court about the nature of an accused's request for counsel: [ 430 ] In Jackson, the State concedes that the arraignment represented the initiation of formal legal proceedings, and that the Sixth Amendment attached at that point. (1977); Massiah v. United States,

Michigan football's Giles Jackson covers many topics during Sept. 17, 2020 conference call after the announcement of the Big Ten fall football season. The defendant, Bladel, was convicted of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder based on a confession he gave to the police. [ The Court's decision today rests on the following deceptively simple line of reasoning: Edwards v. Arizona, at 451 U.S. 484.

(1981), created a bright-line rule to protect a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights; Sixth Amendment rights are even more important than Fifth Amendment rights; therefore, we must also apply the Edwards rule to the Sixth Amendment. This leaves the Court, however, in an analytical straitjacket. To put it simply, the prophylactic rule set forth in Edwards makes no sense at all except when linked to the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination. The Court did so in Montejo v.Louisiana (07-1529), in an opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia.

In these cases, the request for counsel was made to a judge during arraignment, and the basis for the Michigan Supreme Court opinion was the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the assistance of counsel. Thus, although the Michigan court's holding on the other statements does mean that Jackson's conviction must be reversed regardless of this Court's decision, the admissibility of the seventh statement is controlled by that court's Sixth Amendment analysis, and is properly before us. 475 U.S. 625* Syllabus. See Moran v. Burbine, ante, at 424-425; Oregon v. Elstad,

The Sixth Amendment also imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the accused's choice to seek this assistance.

In both cases, the Michigan Supreme Court held that postarraignment confessions were improperly obtained -- and the Sixth Amendment violated -- because the defendants had, "requested counsel during their arraignments, but were not afforded an opportunity to consult with counsel before the police initiated further interrogations.". Defendant Timothy Jackson was convicted by a jury on six counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually abusing a young member of the church where he served as pastor. In a decision written by Justice Stevens, the Court held that once an accused individual has claimed a right to counsel at a plea hearing or other court proceeding, a waiver of that right during later police questioning would be invalid un… "In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), where, as in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had accrued, the Court held that a valid waiver of counsel rights should not be inferred from the mere response by the accused to overt or more subtle forms of interrogation or other efforts to elicit incriminating information. (1977) (quoting Kirby). The Court phrases the question presented in these cases as whether the Edwards rule applies "to a defendant who has been formally charged with a crime and who has requested appointment of counsel at his arraignment." We thus hold that, if police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.

3 Id., at 464. In short, as we explained in later cases, "Edwards did not confer a substantive constitutional right that had not existed before; it `created a protective umbrella serving to enhance a constitutional guarantee.'" . Accordingly, it affirmed Jackson's conviction of murder, although it set aside the conspiracy conviction on unrelated grounds. Prior to that questioning, the officers properly advised Bladel of his Miranda rights.

It distinguished Edwards on the ground that Jackson's request for an attorney had been made at his arraignment whereas Edwards' request had been made during a custodial interrogation by the police.

8

U.S. 436 . .

Prior to that questioning, the officers properly advised Bladel of his Miranda rights.

[475 471 This invokes the ancient axiom that hard cases can make bad law. The Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination provides the right to counsel at custodial interrogations. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. Nor, I suspect, would such a claim likely be borne out by empirical evidence. [475 at 465 U. S. 646: "once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, any subsequent conversation must be initiated by him." The question is not whether respondents had a right to counsel at their postarraignment, custodial interrogations. U.S. 638, 644 Brief for Petitioner in No. Once asserted, the right to counsel cannot be waived. See also United States v. Gouveia, In the interim, on March 26, 1979, two police officers interviewed Bladel in the county jail and obtained a confession from him. (1938). The Michigan Court of Appeals held that Jackson's later statement was properly received in evidence.

U.S. 201

469 (1964). a request [for counsel]." Id. U.S. 625, 640] (1980), or the electronic surveillance of conversations with third parties, see Maine v. Moulton, supra; Massiah v. United States, . Id. .

for counsel at an arraignment, or about the police responsibility to know of and respond to such a request, our opinion today resolves them. Footnote 3 368 U.S. 387, 398 [Footnote 9] Just as written waivers are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Fifth Amendment analysis, so too they are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Sixth Amendment analysis.

We find no warrant for a different view under a Sixth Amendment analysis. 421 Mich. 39, 67-68, 365 N.W.2d 56, 69 (1984). . Although he had inquired about his representation several times since the arraignment, Bladel was not told that a law firm had been appointed to represent him.

Once this request occurs, the police may not conduct further interrogations until counsel has been made available to the accused, unless the accused initiates further communications, exchanges, or conversations with the police. The state-court opinion, however, does not apply that prearraignment-delay holding to the seventh statement. Click the citation to see the full text of the cited case. [13], Edwards is grounded in the understanding that "the assertion of the right to counsel [is] a significant event," 451 U.S. at 451 U.S. 485, and that "additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel." See, e. g., Maine v. Moulton,