2013) (DSM-5)). than upon Moore's apparent adaptive strengths," ante, at 6-7, and for "rel[ying] heavily upon adaptive improvements made in prison," ante, at 8.

caution against reliance on adaptive strengths developed 'in a controlled setting,' as a prison surely is." At the outset of our opinion, we recognized as valid the three underlying legal criteria that both the trial court and appeals court had applied. We again review its decision, and we reverse its determination. Fourth, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals required "Moore to show that his adaptive deficits were not related to 'a personality disorder.' For one thing, the court of appeals again relied less upon the adaptive deficits to which the trial court had referred than upon Moore's apparent adaptive strengths. (quoting DSM-5, at 38). 15–797. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 18). Such a failure would be understandable given the "lack of guidance [Moore] offers to States seeking to enforce the holding of Atkins." The court said that, in doing so, it would “abandon reliance on theBriseno evi… That evidence includes the young Moore's inability to understand and answer family members, even a failure on occasion to respond to his own name. Moore v. Texas, 581 U. S. ___ (2017). . Id., at ___-___ (slip op., at 3-4) (citing American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports (11th ed. I would deny the petition for a writ of certiorari. But the similarity of language and content between Briseno's factors and the court of appeals' statements suggests that Briseno continues to "pervasively infec[t] the [the appeals courts'] analysis." The court of appeals found that Moore "responded rationally and coherently to questions."

. Moore sought state habeas relief and argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. But there was significant disagreement between the state courts about whether Moore had the adaptive deficits needed for intellectual disability. to Pet. Emphasizing the Briseno factors over clinical factors, we said, " 'creat[es] an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.' 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13). MOORE . We criticized the use of these factors both because they had no grounding in prevailing medical practice, and because they invited "lay perceptions of intellectual dis-ability" and "lay stereotypes" to guide assessment of intellectual disability. as Amici Curiae in No. 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3). While the Court divided on the appropriate disposition, both the majority and the dissent agreed that the Court of Criminal Appeals should have assessed Moore's claim of intellectual disability under contemporary standards rather than applying the outdated evidentiary factors laid out in Ex parte Briseno, 135 S. W. 3d 1, 8 (Tex. Moore has now filed a petition for certiorari in which he argues that the trial court record demonstrates his intellectual disability. . Please try again. Briseno asked whether the defendant could "respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral and written questions." . Ex parte Moore II, 548 S. W. 3d, at 572, 603 (observing that Moore "w[ore] a wig, conceal[ed] the weapon, and fle[d]" after the crime). Id., at 565. * This is not our role. 2004), and again emphasized Moore's adaptive strengths rather than his deficits. J.) The Briseno factors were: whether "those who knew the person best during the developmental stage" thought of him as "mentally retarded"; whether he could "formulat[e] plans" and "car[ry] them through"; whether his conduct showed "leadership"; whether he showed a "rational and appropriate" "response to external stimuli"; whether he could answer questions "coherently" and "rationally"; whether he could "hide facts or lie effectively"; and whether the commission of his offense required "forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose." For the reasons we have described, the Court set aside the judgment of the appeals court and remanded the case "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." Moore, 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18). App. Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy. MOORE v. TEXAS. 2004).

Moore, 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12). For another thing, the court of appeals relied heavily upon adaptive improvements made in prison. If the Court is convinced that the Court of Criminal Appeals made a legal error, it should vacate the judgment below, pronounce the standard that we failed to provide in Moore, and remand for the state court to apply that standard. 2. Petitioner Moore was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for fatally shooting a store clerk during a botched robbery that occurred when Moore was 20 years old. The majority's belief that the state court failed to follow Moore on remand merely proves that "[n]either the Court's articulation of this standard [in Moore] nor its application sheds any light on what it means." And, as we have said, it reached the same conclusion it had before. This left "the line between the permissible--consideration, maybe even emphasis--and the forbidden--'overemphasis'--. 135 S. W. 3d, at 8. But there are also sentences here and there suggesting reliance upon what we earlier called "lay stereotypes of the intellectually disabled." . . detracted from a determination that his intellectual and adaptive deficits were related."

The recent Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. ____, 137 S.Ct. At 13, Moore lacked basic understanding of the days of the week, the months of the year, and the seasons; he could scarcely tell time or comprehend the standards of measure or the basic principle that subtraction is the reverse of addition.

Id., at 570.

With respect to the first criterion, we wrote that Moore's intellectual testing indicated his was a borderline case, but that he had demonstrated sufficient intellectual-functioning deficits to require consideration of the second criterion--adaptive functioning. for Cert.

childhood abuse[,] and suffering  . 15-797, at 19). When this case was before us two years ago, I wrote in dissent that the majority's articulation of how courts should enforce the requirements of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 (2002), lacked clarity. In applying those standards to the trial court record, it found the State's expert witness, Dr. Kristi Compton, " 'far more credible and reliable' " than the other experts considered by the trial court. But "[c]linicians . for Cert. Second, the appeals court "stressed Moore's improved behavior in prison."

But the trial court heard, among other things, evidence that in school Moore was made to draw pictures when other children were reading, and that by sixth grade Moore struggled to read at a second-grade level. The petition for certiorari is granted. Moore, 581 U. S., at ___ (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (slip op., at 10). I therefore respectfully dissent. Moore v. Texas, 581 U. S. ___, ___-___ (2017) (slip op., at 10-11). As for that pro se hearing, the court observed that Moore read letters into the record "without any apparent difficulty."

measures," ibid. Indeed, each of the errors that the majority ascribes to the state court's decision is traceable to Moore's failure to provide a clear rule. 2004).

I certainly would not summarily reverse and make our own finding of fact without even giving the State the opportunity to brief and argue the question.

Id., at 562. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 527–528 (Ex parte Moore I). 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14) (quoting Brief for APA et al.

Id., at 560-562. Instead, the appeals court emphasized Moore's capacity to communicate, read, and write based in part on pro se papers Moore filed in court. 2010) (AAIDD-11); American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.

Id., at 570-571, and n. 149. On the basis of this and other evidence, the trial court found that Moore had intellectual disability and thus was ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 (2002).

Ex parte Moore II, 548 S. W. 3d, at 566-569. But this time it focused almost exclusively on the second criterion, adaptive deficits. Ibid. Ex parte Moore I, 470 S. W. 3d, at 486, 489. Ibid.

. for Cert. Id., at 564, and n. 95. The court of appeals wrote that Moore's crime required "a level of planning and forethought." On remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the leading contemporary clinical standards for assessing intellectual disability, applied those standards to the record, and once again determined that Moore is eligible for the death penalty.

The court again noted the three basic criteria: intellectual-functioning deficits, adaptive deficits, and early onset. Ex parte Moore II, 548 S. W. 3d, at 563-565. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply. It concluded that Moore has command of elementary math, but its examples concern trips to the prison commissary, commissary purchases, and the like.

581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4); see App. Moore v. Texas, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 18). The Attorney General of Texas' motion to intervene is denied; we have considered that filing as an amicus brief. v. TEXAS . Moore v. Texas was a case argued during the October 2016 term of the U.S. Supreme Court.Argument in the case was held on November 29, 2016. "But the medical community," we said, "focuses the adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits."

The Court's decision, instead, to issue a summary reversal belies our role as "a court of review, not of first view." The error in this litigation was not the state court's decision on remand but our own failure to provide a coherent rule of decision in Moore. The American Psychological Association (APA), American Bar Association (ABA), and various individuals have also filed amicus curiae briefs supporting the position of Moore and the prosecutor. The prosecutor, the district attorney of Harris County, "agrees with the petitioner that he is intellectually disabled and cannot be executed." for Cert.

First, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals "overemphasized Moore's perceived adaptive strengths." Ex parte Moore, 470 S. W. 3d 481, 527-528 (Ex parte Moore I). Fifth, the appeals court directed state courts, when examining adaptive deficits, to rely upon certain factors set forth in a Texas case called Ex parte Briseno, 135 S. W. 3d 1 (Tex. 310a-311a. . .