MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 360 U. S. 577, observed that: "The effective functioning of a free government like ours depends largely on the force of an informed public opinion.
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 303 U. S. 452; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 308 U. S. 164.

The Seventh Amendment does not, as respondent contends, preclude such an examination by this Court. . If judges are to be treated as 'men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate,' Craig v. Harney, supra, 331 U.S., at 376, 67 S.Ct., at 1255, 91 L.Ed. 1262, where the Court held that a city ordinance forbidding street distribution of commercial and business advertising matter did not abridge the First Amendment freedoms, even as applied to a handbill having a commercial message on one side but a protest against certain official action on the other. . 875, 891-895, 897, 903 (1949); Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 Tex.L.Rev. improper actions and omissions as Governor of Alabama and Ex-Officio Chairman of the State Board of Education of Alabama. In many jurisdictions, legislators, judges and executive officers are clothed with absolute immunity against liability for defamatory words uttered in the discharge of their public duties. . In a democratic society, one who assumes to act for the citizens in an executive, legislative, or judicial capacity must expect that his official acts will be commented upon and criticized. Farmers Educational & Coop. Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134, 146, 97 N.W.2d 719, 725 (1959).25 Since the trial judge did not instruct the jury to differentiate between general and punitive damages, it may be that the verdict was wholly an award of one or the other. Nor can there be a doubt * * * that a government thus intrenched in penal statutes against the just and natural effects of a culpable administration, will easily evade the responsibility which is essential to a faithful discharge of its duty. Errors of fact, particularly in regard to a man's mental states and processes, are inevitable. 1131; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365, 57 S.Ct. Id., pp. We would, I think, more faithfully interpret the First Amendment by holding that at the very least it leaves the people and the press free to criticize officials and discuss public affairs with impunity. (1840).

Instead, the target of the statement must show that it was made with knowledge of or reckless disregard for its falsity. See, e.g., Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 540 (C.A.6th Cir. The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made, with "actual malice" -- that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. See, e.g., Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 540 (C.A. Change ). ", The statement does not indicate malice at the time of the publication; even if the advertisement was not "substantially correct" -- although respondent's own proofs tend to show that it was -- that opinion was at least a reasonable one, and there was no evidence to impeach the witness' good faith in holding it. Respondent did not consider the charge of expelling the students to be applicable to him, since 'that responsibility rests with the State Department of Education.'. 846, 7 L.Ed.2d 795. In my opinion, the Federal Constitution has dealt with this deadly danger to the press in the only way possible without leaving the free press open to destruction -- by granting the press an absolute immunity for criticism of the way public officials do their public duty. 875, 891—895, 897, 903 (1949); Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 Tex.L.Rev. The Report on the Virginia Resolutions further stated: '(I)t is manifestly impossible to punish the intent to bring those who administer the government into disrepute or contempt, without striking at the right of freely discussing public characters and measures; * * * which, again, is equivalent to a protection of those who administer the government, if they should at any time deserve the contempt or hatred of the people, against being exposed to it, by free animadversions on their characters and conduct. "Under our system of government, counterargument and education are the weapons available to expose these matters, not abridgment . * * * The interest of the public here outweighs the interest of appellant or any other individual. One of the acute and highly emotional issues in this country arises out of efforts of many people, even including some public officials, to continue state-commanded segregation of races in the public schools and other public places, despite our several holdings that such a state practice is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. Unlike the Court, therefore, I vote to reverse exclusively on the ground that the Times and the individual defendants had an absolute, unconditional constitutional right to publish in the Times advertisement their criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and officials. See note 2, supra.

The court thus sustained the trial court's instruction as a correct statement of the law, saying: 'In such a case the occasion gives rise to a privilege qualified to this extent. 'The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.' That argument, however, is not responsive to the real issue presented by this case, which is whether that freedom of speech which all agree is constitutionally protected can be effectively safeguarded by a rule allowing the imposition of liability upon a jury's evaluation of the speaker's state of mind. Sweeney v. Patterson, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 1249, 91 L.Ed. 191; '(t)he showing of malice required for the forfeiture of the privilege is not presumed but is a matter for proof by the plaintiff * * *.' The trial judge instructed the jury that such statements were "libelous per se," legal injury being implied without proof of actual damages, and that, for the purpose of compensatory damages, malice was presumed, so that such damages could be awarded against petitioners if the statements were found to have been published by them and to have related to respondent. The court reaffirmed a statement in an earlier opinion that "There is no legal measure of damages in cases of this character." 581, 587, 41 L.Ed. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 357 U. S. 525. 979; cf. I agree with the Court that the Fourteenth Amendment made the First applicable to the States.1 This means to me that since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment a State has no more power than the Federal Government to use a civil libel law or any other law to impose damages for merely discussing public affairs and criticizing public officials. 1173; Jackson, J., dissenting in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288—289, 72 S.Ct. denied, 317 U.S. 678. In answer to a special question, the jury found that the plaintiff had not proved actual malice, and a general verdict was returned for the defendant. 371 U.S. 946, 83 S.Ct. . “[The Sullivan decision] may be right,” late Justice Antonin Scalia said in 2011. 'I would assume that the Commissioner had ordered the police force to do that and therefore it would be his responsibility. 766, 86 L.Ed. . Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666, 45 S.Ct. 413, 419 (1910).
Stopgap measures like those the Court adopts are, in my judgment, not enough. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas, in an opinion by Justice Burch, reasoned as follows (78 Kan., at 724, 98 P. at 286): "It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The reliance is wholly misplaced. ", The trial judge submitted the case to the jury under instructions that the statements in the advertisement were "libelous per se," and were not privileged, so that petitioners might be held liable if the jury found that they had published the advertisement and that the statements were made "of and concerning" respondent. The trial court's error in failing to require any finding of actual malice for an award of general damages makes it unnecessary for us to consider the sufficiency under the federal standard of the instructions regarding actual malice that were given as to punitive damages. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, and 'fighting words,' Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498. Letter to Mrs. Adams, July 22, 1804, 4 Jefferson's Works (Washington ed. See, e.g., 1 Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries (1803), 297 299 (editor's appendix). See, e.g., 1 Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries (1803), 297-299 (editor's appendix). ', Arnold D. Blackwell testified that the third paragraph was associated in his mind with 'the Police Commissioner and the police force. 346 (1889). ", Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 310. 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. See the 1804 Letter to Abigail Adams quoted in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 522, n. 4, 71 S.Ct.