We respectfully disagree. The Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of conviction is reinstated. 77 Or. Subscribe to Justia's Free Newsletters featuring summaries of federal and state court opinions. Edwards v. Arizona is entirely consistent with this conclusion. 2d 694 (1966). Decided January 25, 1977 . At this precise point, no "interrogation" was being conducted by the police, and the very next statement by the officer was to ensure that the suspect wanted to talk to the police and the defendant's response was unequivocal. App. 76-201. An individual was convicted of burglary. The question in this case is not whether Miranda warnings should be given, but what the police may do when a suspect in custody requests to consult a lawyer. App. 2d 441 (1963). Here, the state suggests, the cat was only "peeking" out of the bag, State v. Foster, 40 Or. ORS 136.440(1). [1] Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right * * * to be heard by himself and counsel * * *. 231, 603 P.2d 1376 (1979). Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent.

at 89, 672 P.2d 1182. State v. Elstad - 658 P.2d 552. Mar 4, 1985. Decided March 4, 1985. Elstad then voluntarily executed a written confession. A signed confession was used to convict him. Decided by Burger Court . 288 Or.

In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S. Ct. 1285, 84 L. Ed. On remand, defendant argues that, although the second confession does not violate the federal constitution, we should apply a stricter standard under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. v. Background. It is this impact that must be dissipated in order to make a subsequent confession admissible. The state petitions for review from a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing defendant's murder conviction, holding that incriminating statements made by defendant to police while in custody were inadmissible at defendant's trial because the statements were obtained in violation of defendant's rights against self-incrimination under Article I, sections 11 and 12, of the Oregon Constitution[1] and the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
288 Or.

The state's analysis denigrates the importance of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, in which the court held that the warnings were mandatory in order to protect Fifth Amendment rights against "the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings."

2d 222 (1985), Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, reiterated that prophylactic Miranda warnings are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but are instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected, citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2363, 41 L. Ed. Docket no. The Chief Justice wrote that the fundamental purpose of the Miranda decision "was to assure that the individual's right to choose between speech and silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process," but, once warned, "the suspect is free to exercise his own volition in deciding whether or not to make a statement to the authorities."

Atty. Defendant argued that he had invoked his right to counsel and that the police officers failed to stop the interview until *336 counsel for defendant was provided. Diane Alessi, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review.

Defendant was entitled to pick and choose what he wished to talk about. Here, when the officer inquired about a burglary at a certain house, defendant merely stated, "I was there." 2d 182 (1974), and Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at 492, 101 S. Ct. at 1888 (Powell, J., concurring). Conceding that the flagrancy of police misconduct is a factor in another "fruit of the poisonous tree" context[2] and that it may be a factor in the analysis of the "total circumstances of each case" that we must make in these successive interrogation cases, State v. Mendacino, supra, 288 Or. We do not imply that all future elaborations or changes of the analysis by the United States Supreme Court also will apply to a claim under Oregon law. ".

Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) Oregon v. Mathiason. The full confession was made less than one hour after the prior statement. Uncorroborated accomplice testimony is not inadmissible. Finally, we do not need to address whether the voluntary statements made in violation of the Miranda rule are admissible for impeachment purposes. On December 17, 1981, officers McAllister and Burke went to defendant's home with a warrant for his arrest. [3] Defendant also assigns error to the denial of his motion to strike certain evidence as uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.

[2] In determining whether a confession is the fruit of a prior illegal arrest, the flagrancy of the police misconduct in making the arrest is a factor to be considered. He went on to make other incriminating statements concerning the theft of the dynamite used; the testing of the dynamite to make sure it was good; the presence of White and Harris at the test; the testing of the wiring in the victim's car to find a "hot" wire; and the actual wiring of the dynamite to the car and his presence at the car when it was wired. 2d 410, 421 (1986), Justice O'Connor, again writing for the majority, stated that the waiver of rights conveyed in the Miranda warnings involves an inquiry of two distinct dimensions: Chief Justice Rehnquist in Connecticut v. Barrett, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S. Ct. 828, 93 L. Ed.
The Santa Barbara police recorded the interview. It must be remembered that Edwards, after first waiving his Miranda rights during interrogation discussing a possible "deal," said, "I want an attorney before making a deal." 288 Or. 409, 657 P.2d 227 (1983) and State v. Mendacino, 288 Or. 429 U.S. 492. ORS 163.095(2)(c). We now turn to the question when the right to consult counsel is waived. Law enforcement authorities should take a hint: delaying service of a warrant in order to get a defendant to confess may seem cute or even useful, but it is counterproductive. Our inquiry here is whether there was a sufficient break in the stream of events between that inadmissible statement and the written confession to insulate the latter statement from the effect of what went before. The next morning two detectives went to the jail and asked to see Edwards; Edwards replied that he did not want to talk to anyone, but the guard told him that he had to talk and then took him to meet with the detectives. 1654 (1947), and tainted the subsequent confession, under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. Defendant was then informed for the first time of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. The state's argument derives some support from State v. Mendacino, supra. In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 84 L. Ed. Defendant at time of trial asserted violation of both state and federal constitutional rights and in his brief to the Court of Appeals incorporated his trial court objection in addition to requesting the appellate court to adopt the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed.

Oral Argument - October 03, 1984; Opinions. The fact is that we have used the metaphor as a short-hand description of a particular psychological phenomenon a prisoner's lowered resistance to confessing a second time, once a first confession has been given to the extent that we now seem to think that this phenomenon must occur in every case. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Before PETERSON, C.J., and LENT, LINDE, CAMPBELL, CARSON and JONES, JJ. When officers of the Polk County, Ore., Sheriff's Office picked up respondent at his home as a suspect in a burglary, he made an incriminating statement without having been given the warnings required by Miranda v.

In State v. Mendacino, supra, the court stated that an interval of seventy-two hours might be adequate insulation, but was not in that case, given other factors, including that the defendant remained in *555 custody without an opportunity to consult an attorney and that the same two officers who had elicited the original confessions were present at the subsequent interrogation. App.

Media. Syllabus.

Forty-five minutes to an hour elapsed before McAllister and Burke arrived at the jail. With her on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. 2d 694 (1966). I write separately to add two observations.

Before GILLETTE, P.J., and WARDEN and YOUNG, JJ. The dynamite allegedly was wired to Robert Harris's car by defendant Michael Kell and co-defendant Terry White.

2.

Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), was a landmark Supreme Court of the United States case relating to Miranda warnings. 2d 694 (1966). "Barrett made clear his intentions, and they were honored by the police. Defendant appeals his conviction for burglary in the first degree. Before officers had given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, Elstad made an incriminating statement. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 45 L. Ed. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, reflects a balanced and pragmatic approach to enforcing the Miranda warning.

Harris died as the result of a dynamite explosion. 2d 920 (1987), addressed the problem created when a person being interrogated in custody states that he would not make a written statement outside the presence of counsel but is willing to admit orally his involvement in a crime. Connecticut v. Barrett is a reasonable interpretation of the Edwards waiver rule. Regardless of the absence of actual compulsion, the coercive impact of the unconstitutionally obtained statement remains, because in a defendant's mind it has sealed his fate. 658 P.2d 552 (1983) 61 Or.App. STATE of Oregon, Petitioner On Review, Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder.