There is some dispute among the courts of appeals regarding which party bears the burden of proving consent, or the absence thereof, in a civil suit alleging a violation of the Fourth Amendment. THESE SEARCHES WERE NOT DONE BY THE MEDICAL UNIVERSITY FOR INDEPENDENT PURPOSES. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U. S. 444, 455 (1990); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976). App.

In remanding for further consideration of the consent issue, the Supreme Court set specific parameters tailored to these unique circumstances, as indicated by its decision to use the term "informed consent," language that does not appear in the Court's other consent-to-search cases. She delivered a son on November 9 at the MUSC hospital after signing a general consent form upon her admission to the hospital. However, Brown's testimony established that the letters were not immediately available. (If voluntary betrayal of a trust in mere cooperation with the police constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, surely betrayal of a trust at the direction of the legislature must be.) Ferguson again tested positive for cocaine.

Does the Court really believe (or even hope) that, once invalidation of the program challenged here has been decreed, drug testing will cease?

"Guile" (rather than force) had been used to go beyond the scope of the consented access to evidence. . ." One of the ironies of the case, then, may be that the program now under review, which gives the cocaine user a second and third chance, might be replaced by some more rigorous system. According to Nurse Brown's trial testimony, see supra note 6, Ferguson would have received the "To Our Patients" letter before her urine was searched. FERGUSON ET AL.

Pp. This case also differs from the handful of seizure cases in which we have applied a balancing test to determine Fourth Amendment reasonableness. No.

at 496-97, 87 S.Ct. They do not, however, point to any evidence in the record indicating that any of the nine search criteria was more apt to be caused by cocaine use than by some other factor, such as malnutrition, illness, or indigency.

1999).

No one has argued that this pre-Policy medical protocol involved an unconstitutional search. See, e. g., Chandler, 520 U. S., at 308; Skinner, 489 U. S., at 619.

No evidence bearing on this issue was presented by Appellees.

See McGann v. Northeast Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R. *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. Penal Code Ann.

In Griffin itself, this Court noted that "[a]lthough a probation officer is not an impartial magistrate, neither is he the police officer who normally conducts searches against the ordinary citizen." Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 617 (1989).9 Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals concluded that any of the nine criteria used to identify the women to be searched provided either probable cause to believe that they were using cocaine, or even the basis for a reasonable suspicion of such use. Pregnant Women and Substance Use: Overview of Research & Policy in the United States. 616 (holding that choice between forfeiture of Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and loss of employment rendered confession involuntary).

Singleton told Nurse Brown that she consented to a urine drug screen "because she thought she was clean." For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that a rational jury could have found the requisite knowledge of the Policy only as to Singleton and Pear. Why any or all of these is constitutionally significant is baffling. Syllabus. Petitioners seek to distinguish Griffin by observing that probationers enjoy a lesser expectation of privacy than does the general public.

The question before us is a narrower one: whether, whatever the desirability of this police conduct, it violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.

1125-1126. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U. S. 305, 309 (1997). . App.

While state hospital employees, like other citizens, may have a duty to provide the police with evidence of criminal conduct that they inadvertently acquire in the course of routine treatment, when they undertake to obtain such evidence from their patients for the specific purpose of incriminating those patients, they have a special obligation to make sure that the patients are fully informed about their constitutional rights, as standards of knowing waiver require. United States Supreme Court. What about a doctor's--or a spouse's--voluntary provision of information to the police, without the compulsion of a statute? In the summer of 1990, when she was six or seven months pregnant, Pear was referred to the MUSC clinic because she was at high risk for preterm labor. Benesh v. Amphenol Corp. (In re Wildewood Litig. See Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 401 n. 4 (4th Cir. 52(a). Powell delivered her baby shortly after arriving at the hospital; both Powell's and the infant's urine tested positive for cocaine. Under these circumstances, while the policy may well have served legitimate needs unrelated to law enforcement, it had as well a penal character with a far greater connection to law enforcement than other searches sustained under our special needs rationale.

See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 72 n. 5, 121 S.Ct.

Of particular relevance here, the factfinder must consider "the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents."

The weapon was found and used as evidence in the probationer's trial for unlawful possession of a firearm. As respondents have repeatedly insisted, their motive was benign rather than punitive. Ferguson v. City of Charleston Case Brief - Rule of Law: A policy that permits searches where the purpose served is "ultimately indistinguishable form the The second search of Pear was performed when she was in preterm labor.

Because the hospital seeks to justify its authority to conduct drug tests and to turn the results over to law enforcement agents without the knowledge or consent of the patients, this case differs from the four previous cases in which we have considered whether comparable drug tests "fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches." show that the Petitioners consented to MUSC disclosing the information to law enforcement." Infants whose mothers abuse cocaine during pregnancy are born with a wide variety of physical and neurological abnormalities. I think it clear, therefore, that there is no basis for saying that obtaining of the urine sample was unconstitutional. A-67. Id. Rather, they argue that the searches were justified by consent and/or by special needs. In this case, a review of the M-7 policy plainly reveals that the purpose actually served by the MUSC searches "is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control." However, she was arrested and “charged with ‘knowingly, recklessly, or intentionally’ causing her baby to be exposed to controlled substances in the womb—a felony punishable by up to 10 years in prison.” After posting bond she was released from jail but subjected to frequent drug tests while her case was pending trial.

It is to that question that we now turn.

The concurrence makes essentially the same basic error as the Court, though it puts the point somewhat differently: "The special needs cases we have decided," it says, "do not sustain the active use of law enforcement .

1448. Nurse Brown testified that, under this pre-Policy medical protocol, "if people met certain criteria that were listed that were published by the faculty, you know, to go out into the clinics that the following are indicators and would need to be screened, you know, for medical evaluation, then they would have [been screened]." Voluntary consent to a search is such an exception.

Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that a woman who fails to obtain prenatal care could be subject to prosecution for child neglect.

See Brief for American Medical Association et al.

See, e.g., Peagler v. Atlantic Coast R. R. Co., 232 S. C. 274, 101 S. E. 2d 821 (1958). Cf. Id., at 876-877.

Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. as Amici Curiae 18-19. of criminal conduct that they inadvertently acquire in the course of routine treatment, when they undertake to obtain such evidence from their patients for the specific purpose of incriminating those patients, they have a special obligation to make sure that the patients are fully informed about their constitutional rights, as standards of knowing waiver require.24 Cf. U.S. Reports: Ferguson et al.

If a patient tested positive for cocaine upon delivering a child, she was to be arrested "as soon as medically possible." It also provides an affirmative reason for enforcing the Fourth Amendment's strictures. Under the former, after the initial positive drug test, the police were to be notified (and the patient arrested) only if the patient tested positive for cocaine a second time or if she missed an appointment with a substance abuse counselor.5 In 1990, however, the policy was modified at the behest of the solicitor's office to give the patient who tested positive during labor, like the patient who tested positive during a prenatal care visit, an opportunity to avoid arrest by consenting to substance abuse treatment. Amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs were filed, among others, by the AAP, American Medical Association, ACOG, American Public Health Association, American Medical Women’s Association, American Society for Addiction Medicine, National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence, National Association of Social Workers, and the March of Dimes. Individual differences within the oxytocin system—assessed through hormonal levels, epigenetic modification, or genetic variation—have been linked to differential sensitivity to social cues, prosocial behaviors, and stress responsiveness in adults.21.

Id.

99-936.

As with the other Appellants, Joseph was not prosecuted. Under South Carolina law, a viable fetus has historically been regarded as a person; in 1995, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the ingestion of cocaine during the third trimester of pregnancy constitutes criminal child neglect.

of the urine sample was unconsented), there is on my analysis no factual consent issue remaining. As with the other Appellants, however, Hale was not prosecuted.

The special needs cases we have decided do not sustain the active use of law enforcement, including arrest and prosecutions, as an integral part of a program which seeks to achieve legitimate, civil objectives.

Stevens, John Paul - Supreme Court of the United States. See ante, at 80-84. 469 U. S., at 341, n. 7. Instead, we identified the relevant need as "[t]he Government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure [railroad] safety."