The videotape reveals that his eyes jerked noticeably during the gaze test, that he did not walk a very straight line, and that he could not balance himself on one leg for more than several seconds. App. The psychiatrist may have presumed the defendant's remarks to be truthful for purposes of drawing his inferences as to the defendant's state of mind, see South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 561-562, n. 12, 103 S.Ct. All of these holdings were based on Justice Holmes' opinion in Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 31 S.Ct. The Commonwealth argues that the seven questions asked by Officer Hosterman just prior to the sixth birthday question regarding Muniz's name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age—did not constitute custodial interrogation as we have defined the term in Miranda and subsequent cases. Respondent Muniz was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol on a Pennsylvania highway.

Super., at 29, 421 A.2d, at 387).16 With respect to Muniz's verbal statements, however, the court concluded that "none of Muniz's utterances were spontaneous, voluntary verbalizations," 377 Pa.Super., at 390, 547 A.2d, at 423, and because they were "elicited before Muniz received his Miranda warnings, they should have been excluded as evidence." ^15  Most of Muniz's utterances were not clearly discernible, though several of them suggested excuses as to why he could not perform the physical tests under these circumstances. Finally, Officer Deyo asked Muniz to submit to a breathalyzer test designed to measure the alcohol content of his expelled breath. Id., at 764, 86 S.Ct., at 1832. Because the privilege was designed primarily to prevent "a recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality," Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428, 76 S.Ct. After canvassing the purposes of the privilege recognized in prior cases, [8] we concluded that "[t]hese policies are served when the privilege is asserted to spare the accused from having to reveal, directly or indirectly, his knowledge of facts relating him to the offense or from having to share his thoughts and beliefs with the Government." Under Pennsylvania law, driving under the influence of alcohol consists of driving while intoxicated to a degree " 'which substantially impairs [the suspect's] judgment, or clearness of intellect, or any of the normal faculties essential to the safe operation of an automobile.' . Id., at 302, n. 8, 100 S.Ct., at 1690, n. 8; supra, at 610-611. After analyzing both the "statements [the defendant] made, and remarks he omitted," id., at 464, 101 S.Ct., at 1874, the psychiatrist made a prognosis as to the defendant's "future dangerousness" and testified to this effect at his capital sentencing hearing. Stat. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), the Court defined the phrase "functional equivalent" of express questioning to include "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. 487 U.S., at 210-211, 108 S.Ct., at 2348. I continue to have serious reservations about the Court's limitation of the Fifth Amendment privilege to "testimonial" evidence. In Schmerber, for example, we held that the police could compel a suspect to provide a blood sample in order to determine the physical makeup of his blood and thereby draw an inference about whether he was intoxicated. 2394, 2397, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990). . 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983).

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468, n. 37, 86 S.Ct. In South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 592-600. Id., at 765, 86 S.Ct., at 1832. But cf. During custodial interrogation, the pressure on the suspect to respond flows not from the threat of contempt sanctions, but rather from the "inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." The Court finds the admission at trial of Muniz's responses permissible, however, because they were not incriminating "except to the extent [they] exhibited a tendency to slur words, which [the Court already found to be] nontestimonial [evidence]." At its core, the privilege reflects our fierce " 'unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt,' " Doe, 487 U.S., at 212, 108 S.Ct., at 2348 (citation omitted), that defined the operation of the Star Chamber, wherein suspects were forced to choose between revealing incriminating private thoughts and forsaking their oath by committing perjury.
^22  The parties have not asked us to decide whether any error in this case was harmless. Moreover, false testimony does not give rise directly to sanctions (either religious sanctions for lying under oath or prosecutions for perjury), but only indirectly (false testimony might itself prove incriminating, either because it links (albeit falsely) the suspect to the crime or because the prosecution might later prove at trial that the suspect lied to the police, giving rise to an inference of guilty conscience).

forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt"). 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), we reaffirmed our previous understanding that the privilege against self-incrimination protects individuals not only from legal compulsion to testify in a criminal courtroom but also from "informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning." (a) The privilege against self-incrimination protects an "accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature," Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct. The content of his truthful answer supported an inference that his mental faculties were impaired, because his assertion (he did not know the date of his sixth birthday) was different from the assertion (he knew the date was (correct date)) that the trier of fact might reasonably have expected a lucid person to provide. He responded to each of these questions, stumbling over his address and age.
Muniz then signed a statement waiving his rights and admitted in response to further questioning that he had been driving while intoxicated. The booking questions, like the sixth birthday question, required Muniz to (1) answer correctly, indicating lucidity, (2) answer incorrectly, implying that his mental faculties were impaired, or (3) state that he did not know the answer, also indicating impairment. ^4  The Superior Court's opinion refers to Art. Stat. See supra, at 590-592. In Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. . The psychiatrist had no investigative interest in whether the defendant's account of the crime and other disclosures were either accurate or complete as a historical matter; rather, he relied on the remarks—both those made and omitted—to infer that the defendant would likely pose a threat to society in the future because of his state of mind. ("[T]he blood test evidence .

1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, he was taken to a booking center where, as was the routine practice, he was told that his actions and voice would be videotaped. "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." BRENNAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and IV, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III-B, in which MARSHALL, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III-C, in which O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. We also acknowledged that "both federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture." "[I]n order to be testimonial, an accused's communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information. He was also asked, and was unable to give, the date of his sixth birthday. The Court says: "When Officer Hosterman asked Muniz if he knew the date of his sixth birthday and Muniz, for whatever reason, could not remember or calculate that date, he was confronted with the trilemma [i.e., the ' "trilemma" of truth, falsity, or silence,' see ante, at 597]. 18, is inapposite. As amicus United States explains, "[r]ecognizing a 'booking exception' to Miranda does not mean, of course, that any question asked during the booking process falls within that exception. While Muniz was attempting to comprehend Officer Hosterman's instructions and then perform the requested sobriety tests, Muniz made several audible and incriminating statements.15 Muniz argued to the state court that both the videotaped performance of the physical tests themselves and the audiorecorded verbal statements were introduced in violation of Miranda. .