But I had supposed that we were bound in any event to do justice and administer the law as between the parties who have come before us. Before confirming, please ensure that you have thoroughly read and verified the judgment. 1320: "Expatriation is the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of nationality and allegiance. Title devised, in English, by Library staff. Thus Congress provided that "in time of war" desertion within the United States should at once and unconditionally result in "expatriation" if determined by the conviction of a court-martial, and it would be most unreasonable to confine desertions "within the United States" to desertions to an enemy. Citation. Margaret E. Millus, Leonard P. Moore, U.S. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to revoke citizenship as a punishment for a crime. He had had no intention to "expatriate" himself or to become a national of any other country. Periodical. No. Please log in or sign up for a free trial to access this feature. Also available on microfilm (Law Library Microfilm 84/10004). 356 U.S. 86 (1958), argued 2 May and 28–29 Oct. 1957, decided 31 Mar. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to revoke citizenship as a punishment for a crime.

Also available in digital form on the Library of Congress Web site. U.S. Reports: Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954). The only part of the brief that by the widest latitude could be considered as so much as a vague intimation of the sort is a passage on page 11; and that did not mention the Amendment, but appears to be a part of the general argument that all involuntary expatriation is a denial of "Due Process of Law.". 146. Trop filed suit in US federal courts seeking declaratory judgment that he was a US citizen. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Syllabus At least as applied in this case to a native-born citizen of the United States who did not voluntarily relinquish or abandon his citizenship or become involved in any way with a foreign nation, § 401(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended, which provides that a citizen "shall lose his nationality" by deserting the military or naval forces of the United States in time of war, provided he is convicted thereof by court martial and as a result of such conviction is dismissed or dishonorably discharged from the service, is unconstitutional. In such a case the voluntary action which is of the essence of the right of expatriation is lacking." Despite testifying that he "decided to return to the stockade" when he was picked up, a general court martial convicted Trop of desertion and sentenced him to three years at hard labor, loss of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. Atty., Eastern Dist.

Title U.S. Reports: Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Indeed, the proviso for possible restoration of "nationality" makes it impossible to suppose that the crime was confined to desertion to the enemy. Nevertheless the court held that under the Act of 1940 she had done so, because her "place of general abode" between 1941 and 1945 had been Italy, § 1101(a) (33), Title 8 U.S.C.A. 287, a native citizen in 1940 married a citizen of Italy then in this country, and between 1941 and 1945 lived with him in Italy as his wife. However, "denationalization as a punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment," describing it as "a form of punishment more primitive than torture" as it inflicts the "total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. In 1958, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Trop v Dulles that the Eighth Amendment guarantees that citizens cannot be stripped of their democratic citizenship as punishment for a crime. 1164, 1189-1199. The cases linked on your profile facilitate Casemine's artificial intelligence engine in recommending you to potential clients who might be interested in availing your services for similar matters. Again, in Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 70 S.Ct.

Nor did he attempt to have any contact with any enemy of the United States, or to desert to any enemy of the United States or to any foreign country; and no claim was made in the court-martial proceedings that he had done so. Once you create your profile, you will be able to: Claim the judgments where you have appeared by linking them directly to your profile and maintain a record of your body of work. Creating a unique profile web page containing interviews, posts, articles, as well as the cases you have appeared in, greatly enhances your digital presence on search engines such Google and Bing, resulting in increased client interest. Citing Primary Sources. Click here to remove this judgment from your profile. https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep356086/. For guidance about compiling full citations consult Contributor Names Warren, Earl (Judge) Supreme Court of the United States (Author) 135, 97 L.Ed. In 1952, Trop applied for a passport, which was denied because the Nationality Act of 1940 provided that members of the armed forces of the United States who deserted would lose their citizenship. Audio Transcription for Oral Reargument - October 28, 1957 in Trop v. Dulles Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - May 02, 1957 in Trop v. Dulles Audio Transcription for Oral Reargument - October 29, 1957 in Trop v. Dulles Earl Warren:-- Petitioner, versus John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State of the United States. As will appear, we do not find enough doubt of the constitutionality of the statute to resort to any but the natural meaning of the words: i.e., that "in time of war" desertion of any kind results in "expatriation." Solicitor General. The Supreme Court reversed. Restored to the calendar for reargument June 24, 1957. Supreme Court of the United States - Warren, Earl. 70.

The next day he surrendered; and meanwhile he had made no attempt to leave the area under control of American troops. Plaintiff-appellant has cited to us and obviously relied on the masterful analysis of expatriation legislation set forth in the Comment, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 Yale L.J. The plaintiff did not suggest anything of the kind in his complaint, or upon the motion for summary judgment; Judge Inch did not mention it in disposing of the motion, nor did the plaintiff do so in argument. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) Trop v. Dulles. TROP v. DULLES(1958) No. United States Supreme Court. * Enter a valid Journal (must 17, 97 L.Ed. (1957) U.S. Reports: Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86. U.S. Reports: Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86. Since I doubt if I can add to the persuasive arguments there made, I shall merely incorporate by reference. U.S. Reports: Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86. 70 Argued: May 2, 1957 Decided: March 31, 1958. The next day, he willingly surrendered to an army officer and was taken back to the base, where he was subsequently court-martialed, found guilty, and sentenced to three years at hard labor, forfeiture of pay, and a dishonorable discharge. Section 1483(a) of Title 8 provides that, except for subsections (7), (8) and (9), none of the acts mentioned in § 1481, shall result in "expatriation" if they occur within the United States, unless they are followed by a "residence outside the United States." On procedure I think we are bound as judges to face and decide this issue. Albert Trop was a natural born citizen of the United States who, while serving as a private in the United States Army in 1944, deserted from an Army stockade in Casablanca, Morocco. More about Copyright and other Restrictions. of New York, Brooklyn, N.Y., for defendants-appellees. The ruling's reference to "evolving standards of decency" is frequently cited in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. contains alphabet). It is unfair to the capable and experienced lawyer who presented this appeal to hold that he did not present this argument. Subdivision (7) provides for a "formal written renunciation," subdivision (9) is for treason and subdivision (8) is the one at bar. Osmond K. Fraenkel, New York City, for plaintiff-appellant. Decided March 31, 1958. Periodical. 638. United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. 1228, was valid which "expatriated" a woman who married an alien in this country; and that too although she had not intended to surrender her citizenship, and did not suppose that she was doing so. Jurisdiction covered: Spain.

a convenience, and may not be complete or accurate. 1957. Reargued October 28-29, 1957. He is a native citizen, who was serving in 1944 in the United States Army in French Morocco; and the only question is whether he lost his "nationality" because he was convicted by the judgment of a court-martial of desertion "in time of war." See Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133, 73 S.Ct. It is true that the act must not be that of an infant, Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 334, 59 S. Ct. 884, 889, 83 L.Ed. ", Dissenting, Justice Felix Frankfurter noted that desertion from the military can be punished by the death penalty, leading him to ask, "Is constitutional dialectic so empty of reason that it can be seriously urged that loss of citizenship is a fate worse than death? Argued May 2, 1957. Since the judgment of the district court was summary we are to accept as true the statements in the plaintiff's affidavit upon the motion that he had been imprisoned in Casablanca in May 1944 for an earlier breach of discipline, and found the condition so intolerable that in desperation he escaped. Warren, E. & Supreme Court Of The United States. In this article, I draw from this case to argue for a broader ‘Trop principle’ of justifiable state punishment. 297, held that the Act of 1907, 34 Stat. It has no application to the removal from this country of a native citizen during minority. The important point in both these decisions is, not the especial "objective" facts that the court accepted as the test, but that on both occasions the citizen forfeited her "nationality," not only without supposing that she was doing so, but against her purpose. The plaintiff appeals from a judgment, summarily dismissing his complaint in an action under § 1503(a) of Title 8 U.S.C.A., for a judgment declaring him to be "a national of the United States." We have not considered, and do not consider, whether under the circumstances at bar "expatriation" was, or was not, a "cruel and unusual" punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 638 . 356 U.S. 86. ", natural born citizen of the United States, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 356, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Trop_v._Dulles&oldid=972958295, United States Supreme Court cases of the Warren Court, Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause case law, American Civil Liberties Union litigation, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License, Both District and Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Trop's claim. 1958 by vote of 5 to 4; Warren, joined by Black, Douglas, and Whittaker, for the plurality, Brennan concurring, Frankfurter, Burton, Clark, and Harlan in dissent. For what other possible reason could he have made the specific and exact citation I have given above? See also Revedin v. Acheson, 2 Cir., 194 F.2d 482, certiorari denied 344 U.S. 820, 73 S.Ct. 106, 60 L. Ed. 17, 97 L.Ed. Mr. Warren, joined by Black, Douglas, Whittaker, Frankfurter, joined by Burton, Clark, Harlan, Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for respondents on the original argument, and Solicitor General Rankin on the reargument; with them on the briefs were Warren Olney, III (then Assistant Attorney General) and J. F. Bishop; Beatrice Rosenberg was also with them on the brief on the re-argument, This page was last edited on 14 August 2020, at 17:30. I am constrained to disagree with both the substance and the procedural form of the result here reached. (A 1944 amendment modified the Act such that a deserter would lose his citizenship only if, on these grounds, he had been dishonorably discharged or dismissed from the military.).